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ACCOUNT STATED RESURRECTED: THE FICTION OF 
IMPLIED ASSENT IN CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION 
Emanwel J. Turnbull† 
INTRODUCTION 
 Since the 2008 financial crisis, state courts have been flooded with 
actions seeking to collect money from consumers. This inundation of 
claims has been accompanied by bad practices, ranging from defective (or 
sewer) service, to robo-signing.1 Cases have even emerged in which a 
single consumer was subjected to two successive claims for the same debt.2 
Suits brought outside the limitation period have also become a problem.3 
The debt buyers purchase tens of billions of dollars in debt every year, but 
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 1. “Sewer service” is the practice of private process servers falsely claiming to have served 
papers on individuals when they have simply thrown the papers away. “Robo-signing” is the practice of 
signing affidavits en-mass with no serious attempt to verify the correctness of the facts stated in the 
affidavit. See THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY ET. AL., DEBT DECEPTION: HOW DEBT BUYERS ABUSE THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM TO PREY ON LOWER-INCOME NEW YORKERS 6 (May 2010), available at 
http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/DEBT_DECEPTION_FINAL_WEB.pdf; Peter A. 
Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of 
Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259, 266, 268 (2011); e.g., Ray Rivera, Suit Claims 
Fraud by New York Debt Collectors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/12/31/nyregion/31debt.html; Martha Neil, Federal Judge Certifies Class In ‘Sewer Service’ Suit 
Against NY Debt Collection Law Firm, A.B.A. J., Sept. 12, 2012, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judge_certifies_class_in_sewer_service_suit_against_n
y_debt_collect/. However, sewer service has long been an issue in debt cases, particularly in New York. 
See DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE 200–201 (1974) (an empirical study, noting that 20% 
of debtors interviewed were personally served, while court records indicated personal service in over 
90% of cases). 
 2. E.g., THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing the case of a B.P. of 
Manhattan, who was sued twice by the same plaintiff, the first suit having been dismissed with 
prejudice); Capital Credit & Collection Serv., Inc. v. Armani, 206 P.3d 1114, 1116–17 (Or. Ct. App. 
2009) (finding that debt collector settled a debt and then instituted litigation on the same debt). 
 3. E.g., Andrew Martin, Old Debts That Won’t Die, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/31/business/31collect.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION 
AND ARBITRATION 29 (July 2010) [hereinafter REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM] (“Many consumer 
advocates and some judges expressed the view that some collectors regularly sue consumers on time-
barred debts.”). 
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the rise of debt buying has been accompanied by increased consumer 
complaints.4 The high volume of claims and the abuse of consumers that 
accompanies them led the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to declare the 
debt collection system “broken,”5 providing insufficient protection for 
consumers. While creditors usually attempt to collect debts without 
litigation, creditors still file a very large number of suits against consumers. 
For example, from 2009 to 2012, a group of fifteen debt-buying businesses 
filed over 131,000 such suits in Maryland.6 That is one suit for every forty-
four residents.7 
 This Article is about one feature of the collection claims “flood”:8 the 
resurrection of a 300-year-old doctrine, little-used in America since the 
1950s. This Article calls that doctrine “implied account stated” and it can 
be found in collection actions around the country.9 Implied account stated is 
a cause of action, pled when a creditor sues to recover a debt.10 
 Implied account stated is one part of the wider action for an account 
stated, and to understand the implied form it is necessary to explain the 
account stated more generally. An “account stated” is an agreement, 
express or implied, between parties who have prior dealings11 that a 
particular sum is due from one to the other and a promise by the debtor to 
                                                                                                                 
 4. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING 
INDUSTRY 1, 7 (2013) [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES] (highlighting the Neilson Report, 
which states that $72.3 billion in debt was purchased by debt buyers in 2008). 
 5. REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 1. 
 6. Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Junk Debt 
Buyers in Maryland, LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 7. In 2010, Maryland had an estimated population of 5,785,681. Table 1. Annual Estimates of 
the Resident Population for Counties of Maryland: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(Apr. 2012), http://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/totals/2011/tables/CO-EST2011-01-24.xls. 
 8. Sam Glover, Has The Flood Of Debt Collection Lawsuits Swept Away Minnesotans’ Due 
Process Rights?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2009); Matthew Kish, Debt Cases Flood 
Courts, PORTLAND BUS. J. (2011), available at http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/print-edition/2011/ 
02/25/debt-cases-flood-courts.html?page=all. A recent New York study showed that in some 
jurisdictions 90% of all civil filings were debt collection cases. NEW ECONOMY PROJECT, THE DEBT 
COLLECTION RACKET IN NEW YORK: HOW THE INDUSTRY VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND PERPETUATES 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 6 (2013), available at http://www.nedap.org/resources/documents/ 
DebtCollectionRacketNY.pdf. 
 9. See generally West Virginia: Complaint, Cach, LLC, v. Wagner, No. 07-C-2177, 2007 WL 
5964644 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 12, 2007); Complaint, Cach, LLC., v. Anthony, No. 07-C-2309, 2007 
WL 5964653 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2007 Oct. 25, 2007); Pennsylvania: Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC., v. 
Mostyn, No. 2010-3233 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 2011), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/ 
unreported/Calvary.pdf; Target Nat’l Bank v. Greiner, No. Cl-09-03069 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 30, 
2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/unreported/Target_Greiner.pdf; New York: 
Discover Bank v. Sura, No. CV-11-3421, 2012 WL 1450028, at *1–3 (Poughkeepsie City Ct. Apr. 26, 
2012); Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2000).  
 10. See cases cited supra note 9; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 282 (1979) 
(stating that an account stated may be implied, and this may be binding on the parties). 
 11. Some jurisdictions say that the dealings must be a monetary nature. Toth v. Mansell, 566 
N.E.2d 730, 734–35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Rehmann v. Balduchi, 169 N.W.2d 894, 895 (Iowa 1969). 
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pay the sum due to the creditor.12 This definition is necessarily broad 
because of the variation between different jurisdictions about the nature of 
account stated. For example, some jurisdictions treat it as a distinct cause of 
action, which does not create new liability,13 but can be used independently 
of any other cause of action.14 Others hold that account stated does nothing 
more than create a presumption that the stated amount is correct.15  
 So, account stated, in its broadest sense, has two elements: 
 
1. There must be some pre-existing debt or obligation of payment;16 
and 
2. The debtor must assent to the sum owed and promise to pay, either: 
(a) Expressly, or 
(b) Implicitly, by a failure to object to a statement of account within 
a reasonable time.17 
                                                                                                                 
 12. This definition is a synthesis of those found in various sources: 1A C.J.S. Account 
Stated § 1 (2005); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accounts and Accounting § 26 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 282 (1979); see infra the cases from New York and Maryland cited in Part II. 
 13. E.g., Balt. Cnty. v. Archway Motors Inc., 370 A.2d 113, 118 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) 
(“An account stated cannot be made the instrument to create an original liability; it merely determines 
the amount of the debt where liability previously existed.” (quoting Conley v. Nat’l House Furnishing 
Co., 11 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937))). This rule was also present historically. See JOSEPH 
CHITTY, JR., A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, NOT UNDER SEAL; AND UPON THE 
USUAL DEFENCES TO ACTIONS THEREON 648–48a (Tompson Chitty eds., 6th Am. ed. 1844) [hereinafter 
CHITTY 6TH] (“There must however have existed some demand against the defendant, or some prior 
transactions between the parties in respect of which the account was stated, and a mere special 
agreement to pay a sum of money cannot be converted into an account stated.”); JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A 
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, NOT UNDER SEAL; AND UPON THE USUAL 
DEFENCES TO ACTIONS THEREON 197, 199 (Francis J. Troubat ed., 3d Am. ed. 1834) [hereinafter 
CHITTY 3D] (to similar effect).  
 14. E.g., Archway, 370 A.2d at 117 (account stated limited to cases where there is a pre-
existing debt); Lyell v. Walbach, 75 A. 339, 341 (Md. 1909) (holding that account stated is an 
independent cause of action); Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 302 (to similar effect). 
 15. For example, Florida uses presumption language. First Union Discount Brokerage Servs. v. 
Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 841 (11th Cir. 1993). One Federal District Court, applying New York law, also 
used the language of presumption to explain account stated: Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Instituto 
Nacional de Reaseguros, No. 88-Civ.-0917, 1991 WL 4461, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1991). 
 16. Archway, 370 A.2d at 118 (“[T]here can be no liability on an account stated if liability did 
not previously exist.”); Gurney, Becker & Bourne, Inc. v. Benderson Development Co., 394 N.E.2d 282, 
283 (N.Y. 1979) (“[A]n account stated cannot be made the instrument to create liability when none 
exists.”); Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589, 592 (W. Va. 1985) (“[W]here persons who 
have had previous transactions of a monetary character agree that the account representing the 
transactions and the balance shown are correct, and the debtor expressly or impliedly promises to pay 
such balance, the account thereby becomes an account stated.” (quoting Hoover Dimeling Lumber Co., 
v. Neill, 87 S.E. 855, 855 (W. Va. 1916))). 
 17. Archway, 370 A.2d at 118 (“[U]nder appropriate circumstances, a failure within a 
reasonable time to object to the correctness of a stated sum may be regarded as an admission of 
liability.”); Gurney, Becker & Bourne, Inc., 394 N.E.2d at 282 (N.Y. 1979) (“[A]n account which has 
been rendered and to which no objection has been made within a reasonable time should be regarded as 
admitted by the party charged as prima facie correct[.]”); Frederic A. Potts & Co. v. Lafayette Nat’l 
Bank, 199 N.E. 50, 52–53 (N.Y. 1935) (“[P]ursuant to the custom of banking, which custom was well 
known to the plaintiff, there was delivered to plaintiff a full and complete monthly statement of its 
342 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 38:339 
 
Implied account stated occurs in situation 2(b): where a debtor fails to 
object to a statement in a timely manner. 
 This Article could begin with a doctrinal question: is this “implied 
account stated” a contract implied in fact, a quasi-contract, or just an 
evidentiary presumption? This is a question that will be reached in Part III. 
However, the more important question is larger and more practical: when 
can account stated be used to collect consumer debts? Account stated 
undeniably is used to collect consumer debts.18 This collection is 
particularly reliant upon the implied form of account stated. A New York 
court went so far as to say that “the raison d'etre of account stated is the 
assumption that the debtor's failure to dispute an account rendered to the 
debtor implies the debtor's agreement to the terms of the account.”19 While 
this Article will argue that account stated should not be used in this way, 
the court’s interpretation is undoubtedly a true statement about current 
practice.20 Lawyers representing consumers have written that account stated 
frequently appears in debt collection pleadings.21 The National Consumer 
Law Center’s manual on consumer debt collection actions cites dozens of 
consumer debt collection cases in various jurisdictions in which account 
stated was at issue.22 In New York and elsewhere, implied account stated 
can be used to limit the amount and type of evidence needed to obtain a 
judgment against a consumer.23 The evidence-reducing quality of account 
stated is particularly important in uncontested cases to establish the proof 
                                                                                                                 
account” and that said statements “were duly received by plaintiff and retained by it.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). But see Price Hill Colliery Co. v. Pinkney, 122 S.E. 434, 436 (W. Va. 1924) (“‘The 
rule that an account rendered and retained for a long time without objection becomes an account stated 
is, as a general proposition, inapplicable in . . . West Virginia, except as between merchant and 
merchant, and principal and agent.’” (quoting McGraw v. Traders’ Nat’l Bank, 63 S.E. 398, 398 (W. 
Va. 1908)). 
 18. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 301; Jaramillo v. Portfolio Acquisitions, LLC, No. 14-08-00939-
CV, 2010 WL 1197669, at *7 (Tex. App. Mar. 30, 2010) (“a cause of action for an account stated is the 
proper tool for credit card collection.”). 
 19. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 302. 
 20. E.g., Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Cutler, 916 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (App. Div. 2011) 
(“An agreement may be implied where a defendant retains bills without objecting to them within a 
reasonable period of time, or makes partial payment on the account.”). 
 21. E.g., Glover, supra note 8, at 1121; Peter A. Holland, Defending Junk-Debt-Buyer 
Lawsuits, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 12, 16 (2012); Clinton Rooney, Defense of Assigned Consumer 
Debts, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 542, 545 (2010); see cases cited infra, Part I.B.1. 
 22. NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, COLLECTION ACTIONS: DEFENDING CONSUMERS 
AND THEIR ASSETS 86–90 (2011 & Supp. 2013). 
 23. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 303. E.g., Discover Bank v. Sura, No. CV-11-3421, 2012 WL 
1450028, at *3 (Poughkeepsie City Ct. Apr. 26, 2012) (“Plaintiff does not have to submit a signed copy 
of an agreement in order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment based upon the account 
stated . . . .”). 
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necessary to obtain an uncontested judgment. Most consumers do not 
defend debt collection suits.24  
 The resurrection of account stated in debt collection has presented a 
significant challenge to lawyers and judges. Account stated is an unfamiliar 
cause of action and even lawyers experience confusion about its exact 
meaning. One Maryland judge believed that “account stated” meant simply 
a credit card statement.25 Lawyers and judges are uncertain of its nature and 
even its continued existence.26 It is perhaps this unfamiliarity that causes 
account stated to appear even if contrary to established precedent; as noted 
below, account stated is pled in West Virginia cases, but implied account 
stated is clearly limited in West Virginia to mercantile and agency 
relationships.27  
 This evidence-reducing quality is also important to the recent flood of 
collection litigation. One of the driving forces of the flood is the secondary 
debt market.28 Large numbers of collection actions are brought by 
businesses that purchase defaulted consumer debts from original creditors 
such as banks.29 The Federal Trade Commission investigated the debt 
buying industry because of concerns about some debt buyers’ practices.30 
The Commission’s findings give insight into the particular value of account 
stated for debt buyers. Debt buyers purchase large numbers of debts in 
“portfolios.”31 Each portfolio comes with a data file of basic information 
                                                                                                                 
 24. REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 7; Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and 
Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 257, 288 (2011) (concluding that only 20% of consumers attempted to respond to lawsuits in a 
sample of collection cases); THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 9 (finding that only 10% of 
consumers answered debt collection complaints). Consumers are even less likely to respond to suits 
today than they were in 1967. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 2, at 215 (stating 19% of debtor-defendants in 
three cities studied appeared in court to defend themselves). 
 25. Interview with Anonymous Judge, Dist. Ct. Md. (2011) (on file with author). 
 26. One attorney who represents defendants in collection actions argues that account stated 
was abolished in 1984 with the abolition of common law pleading in Maryland, and states that this 
argument is accepted by some judges and rejected by others. (Comments on earlier draft, on file with 
author). 
 27. See infra Part I.B.1.  
 28. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at i (explaining that the FTC chose to study the 
debt buying industry because its appearance has been the major change in the debt collection field in 
recent years and has been accompanied by increased consumer complaints to the FTC). 
 29. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom–in Lawsuits, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 28, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230451070457556221291
9179410.html. See Holland supra note 21, at 12 (commenting that one attorney acting for a debt buyer 
in Maryland filed 130 complaints on a single day another debt-buyer filed more than 7000 cases in two 
months). 
 30. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at i (relying upon data from nine very large 
debt buyers that resell some of the debts they purchase, so the report may not reflect the practices of 
smaller debt buyers who buy debts several times removed from the original creditor). Id. at 7. 
 31. See REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 7 (understanding that the large 
number of debts purchased by debt buyers lead to collection actions). 
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about each individual debtor, but rarely includes documents.32 If debt 
buyers require copies of documents, they have a limited time to ask for 
them and may have to pay extra for each individual document.33 Further, 
debt buyers often sell debts to other debt buyers, so that the business that 
sues to recover the debt may be several steps removed from the original 
creditor.34 The debt buyer who sues must request documents through each 
previous buyer in the chain back to the original creditor, and the documents 
must come back down through the chain in the same manner.35 Presenting 
documentary evidence of a debt can be expensive for debt buyers in 
administrative resources, time, and money. In some cases, it may be 
impossible because time to request documents has expired.36 
 Implied account stated is useful to debt buyers because it does not 
require proof of the original contract between the consumer and the original 
creditor.37 Instead, it requires evidence of the “rendition of account” 
(sending an account statement).38 This could be as little as a copy of the last 
statement of account sent to the consumer, when combined with the 
allegation that an account existed and no objection was made to the 
statement. Implied account stated allows plaintiffs, debt buyers in 
particular, to collect on inadequately documented debts. An inquiry into 
precisely why documentation is difficult to obtain is beyond the scope of 
this Article. However, mortgage foreclosure cases offer obvious parallels 
with problems of inadequate documentation.39 The lack of documents in 
those cases is a symptom of the way mortgages were traded on the 
secondary debt market.40 
                                                                                                                 
 32. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 34–35. 
 33. Id. at 39–40. 
 34. See id. at 19 (describing the sale of debt to secondary debt buyers). 
 35. See id. at C-10 (“Subsequent purchasers of the consumer debt accounts were generally 
prohibited from directly contacting the credit issuer for document copies. They were required instead to 
make such requests through the initial debt buyer, who would then contact the credit issuer and request 
document copies.”). 
 36. See id. at C-12 (“Many contracts specified a date beyond which the credit issuer was no 
longer obligated to provide any account documents to the debt buyer. This date was often set at two to 
three years following the date of sale.”). 
 37. See Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. Denboer, 791 N.W.2d 264, 267, 278 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2010) (holding that Capital One was only required to produce the consumers’ account statements 
because “‘the original items’ are not a necessary prerequisite to obtaining a default judgment.”). 
 38. Id. at 278. 
 39. See generally James Geoffrey Durham, Avoiding a Lawyer’s Race to the Foreclosure 
Bottom: Some Advice to Lawyers for Lenders and Borrowers on their Roles in Foreclosure Litigation, 
32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 419 (2012) (discussing the ethical obligations of lawyers representing borrowers 
facing disclosure). 
 40. See Victoria V. Corder, Note, When Securitization Complicates the Issue: What Are the 
Homeowner’s Defenses to Foreclosure, 16 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 229, 315 (2009) 
(giving examples of lack of documentation in cases involving mortgages traded on the secondary 
market). 
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 This Article will present three arguments against the use of implied 
account stated in consumer collections: (1) that implied account stated has 
historical origins in the practices of merchants, but that in the nineteenth 
century those origins were disregarded and that implied account stated is 
doctrinally impermissible in some states in light of their particular reaction 
to that expansion; (2) implied account stated is inappropriate in policy 
terms because it places a substantial burden upon consumers and has an 
evidence reducing quality; and (3) implied account stated is inconsistent 
with principles of modern contract law when applied to consumer 
defendants. 
 Part I will set out the history of account stated, from English law to the 
modern law of three states: West Virginia, New York, and Maryland. West 
Virginia is a special example, in which the state courts long ago held 
against the use of implied account stated in consumer-like cases.41 New 
York is a counter example, in which implied account stated has been 
accepted as an appropriate cause of action in consumer collection actions.42 
Maryland represents the middle ground; its caselaw has neither accepted 
nor rejected implied account stated in these actions.43 In all three 
jurisdictions, however, account stated can be found as a cause of action in 
trial-level consumer collection pleadings, regardless of these doctrinal 
differences. In states like Maryland, the courts are faced with both doctrinal 
and policy questions about the use of account stated.  
 Part II will argue that implied account stated, even if it is doctrinally 
permissible, should not be used in collection actions for simple policy 
reasons: account stated restricts the ability of consumers to demand proof 
that they owe the debt in question, limits the ability of the court to inquire 
into the underlying agreement, and imposes an unfair burden on consumers 
while relieving businesses of a burden, which modern technology makes 
them easily able to bear. 
 Part III will argue that implied account stated is inconsistent with the 
principle that silence and inaction do not give assent. Account stated is a 
cause of action based on an agreement between debtor and creditor, like an 
accord and satisfaction.44 Implied account stated has become analogous to a 
quasi-contract because it relies on the legal fiction that the debtor has 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 42. See Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Brown-Serulovic, 948 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (App. Div. 2012) 
(holding that the plaintiff consumer failed to “establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on 
its cause of action” based on implied account stated theory). 
 43. See Balt. Cnty. v. Archway Motors Inc., 370 A.2d 113, 118 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) 
(recognizing the existence of an account through inference, but denying plaintiff’s claim on accounts 
stated due to the non-existence of underlying debt); see also cases cited infra Part I.B.3. 
 44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 282 (1979). 
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agreed and promised to pay the debt.45 Implied account stated has historical 
origins as an agreement implied in fact—as a rule amongst merchants. That 
original rule is consistent with modern contract principles, but the 
expansion of implied account stated to consumers brings it into conflict 
with contractual principles. 
 These problems call for a change to account stated. I will conclude that 
account stated must be brought back to reality and to conformity with its 
underlying principles. Account stated should be implied only where there is 
evidence sufficient to imply, as a matter of fact, that assent was intended. 
Silence and inaction should be insufficient except in the circumstances from 
which the original rule arose: the existence of established trade practices or 
previous dealings. These changes would remove a theoretical inconsistency 
from the law. More importantly, they would prevent the abuse of account 
stated as a vehicle for collection when the plaintiff cannot or will not 
present adequate evidence to succeed on a breach of contract claim. 
Narrowing account stated, whether it is through legislation or judicial 
action, can protect consumers, relieve courts of the burden of grappling 
with this archaic cause of action, and can mend the broken system, at least 
in one small part. 
I. THE HISTORY OF ACCOUNT STATED 
 This Part will set out the history of account stated in general, implied 
account stated in particular, and survey developments in account stated in 
three states: New York, West Virginia, and Maryland. It is important to 
distinguish between “account stated” and “implied account stated” in order 
to follow their history. Implied account stated, as it is called in this Article, 
is a very specific rule with origins distinct from account stated. 
 Account stated has not attracted a great deal of attention from legal 
historians. A short article by the English legal historian S.F.C. Milsom links 
account stated to the action for debt on account.46 In the fourteenth century, 
actions for debt on account—those debts that arose from a series of cross 
transactions—could result in a court ordered accounting. At this time, the 
practice amongst London merchants was to conduct informal settlements of 
accounts amongst themselves.47 These informal settlements appear as 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Juli Loden, The Earth is Not Flat and “A Quasi Contract Is Not A Contract At All”, 11 
TRANSACTIONS: THE TENN. J. OF BUS. LAW 167, 187 (2010); see WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 325 (O.W. Aldrich ed., Am. ed. 1880) (stating that a legal relationship persists 
even though the original form no longer exists). 
 46. S.F.C. MILSOM, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 133 (1985). Account 
stated and the action on account are sometimes still confused today. E.g., Nat’l Check Bureau v. 
Buerger, No. 06-CA-008882, 2006-Ohio-6673, ¶ 20 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2006). 
 47. MILSOM, supra note 46, at 137. 
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concessit solvere actions in the local courts of medieval London.48 This 
customary form of action allowed Londoners to sue without setting out the 
underlying transactions that were the foundation of the debt.49 What we 
now call account stated was then differentiated from an ordinary action 
based on a formal accounting by a third party: account stated relied on an 
informal accounting between the parties only. This informal accounting was 
eventually distinguished in the Common Law courts by the phrase insimul 
computassent.50 Samuel Stoljar agreed with Milsom’s view: “To speak of 
an account stated is as yet not to name an action, but rather to describe an 
activity, namely that the parties voluntarily accounted between 
themselves.”51 Account stated arrived in the legal thought of later centuries 
through that concept: two parties, striking a private agreement about the 
debts owed to each other.  
 Account stated became a branch of assumpsit,52 the ancestor of modern 
actions based on contract. An assumpsit action pleading an account stated 
relied on the same informal reconciliation of accounts, insimul 
computassent, as before: the parties had voluntarily struck an account 
together.53 Account stated was at first objected to on the grounds of the 
emerging doctrine of consideration, but these objections failed.54 Account 
stated came to be distinguished doctrinally from other similar pleadings 
because it affected a kind of novation; a suit for account stated was not 
based upon the underlying transaction, but based on the informal 
accounting.55 This pleading became one of the “common counts” usually 
pled in the alternative in actions for debt.56 The common counts were 
implied contract and quasi-contract theories, most of which are still in use 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 136 (“[T]he custom was to declare upon a concessit solvere in respect of various 
things sold, without setting them out in detail; and, since the defendant could wage his law, it seems that 
this sufficiency of a general reference to the underlying transactions was the only advantage the creditor 
normally gained.”) Milsom goes on to note, however, that in one particular case, the customary action 
could allow the recovery of debt accrued abroad, which were not normally actionable. Id. 
 50. Id. at 141 (“[A]lthough an accounting just between the parties is at first more commonly 
denoted by saying that the defendant computavit cum the plaintiff, insimul computaverunt or insimul 
computassent slowly gains in favour until a prothonotary in 1464 describes it as a standard form to 
distinguish the case from that of the account before auditors.”). 
 51. Samuel Stoljar, What Is Account Stated?, 4 SYDNEY L. REV. 373, 373 (1964). 
 52. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 191 (1973). 
 53. Id. (“A second device was appropriate where tradesmen or merchants had accounted with 
each other or with customers and an agreed total debt was acknowledged.”). 
 54. Stoljar, supra note 51, at 374–75. 
 55. Id. at 374 (“In this way, also, account stated begins to mark itself off from other indebitatus 
counts, in that the present claim is not for money lent, or money had and received, or goods sold and 
delivered, but is a claim in respect of ‘several matters’ that are ‘reduced to a sum certain’. . . .” (quoting 
Howes v. Savill, Cro. Car. 116 (U.K., 1689)). 
 56. Id. at 373. 
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today and familiar to lawyers, for example, money had and received, and 
quantum meruit.  
 While account stated enjoyed controversy as a means of settling debts 
in the eighteenth century,57 the nineteenth century is the period of greatest 
interest for the purposes of this Article. Account stated was received into 
American colonial law with the rest of English law, and it was still in use at 
the turn of the nineteenth century. It was said to be a rule of Chancery 
applying particularly to merchants.58 Toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, account stated enjoyed a great expansion. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century it was regarded, at least in some states, as an independent 
common law cause of action, applicable beyond mercantile relationships. 
Despite this expansion, account stated fell out of use in the early twentieth 
century, until its recent resurrection. 
 The old limitation of account stated—to merchant-merchant dealings—
goes to the doctrine’s core. By examining this requirement and its 
ostensible demise, this Part will show: (1) that the “merchant requirement” 
was not a prerequisite for any account stated, only an element of the 
implication of an account stated; (2) cases often said to have removed the 
merchant requirement are flawed because they treat the requirement as a 
prerequisite to all account stated actions, rather than an element of 
implication; and (3) the ostensible removal of account stated is not uniform 
between states. 
A. A Rule Between Merchants 
 The history of account stated presented above traces the history of a 
concept; the idea that a private accounting accompanied by a promise to 
pay gives rise to an action in some way independent of the underlying 
transactions. These are based upon an actual accounting and agreement to 
pay. This takes us far from the raison d’etre of account stated today: the 
rule that retention without objection of a statement of account equates to an 
assent and promise to pay. This rule has come, for practical purposes, to 
eclipse the rest of the account stated. This section traces the origin and 
development of implied account stated. 
 Some early American cases and writers trace account stated back to 
Sherman v. Sherman in 1692.59 Sherman said that “amongst merchants it is 
looked upon as an allowance of an account current, if the merchant that 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See Stoljar, supra note 51, at 377–78 (discussing claims that were representative of late 
eighteenth century account stated cases). 
 58. Freeland v. Heron, Lenox & Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 147, 151 (1812). 
 59. Sherman v. Sherman, (1692) 23 Eng. Rep. 276, 276 (Ch.). E.g., Frank C. Haddock, The 
Account Stated, 22 CENT. L.J. 76, 76 (1886). 
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receives it does not object against it, in a second or a third post.”60 In 
modern terms, merchant custom held that a statement of account sent out 
and received, but not objected to within a reasonable time—a period set by 
merchant practices—was accepted as correct.61  
 While Sherman has been identified as the earliest account stated case, 
it does not use the expression and appears to be an action for a formal 
accounting. The expression “account stated” is found in Willis v. Jernegan:  
 
[T]here is no absolute necessity that it should be signed by the 
parties who have mutual dealings, to make it a stated account, for 
even where there are transactions, suppose between a merchant in 
England and a merchant beyond sea, and an account is 
transmitted here from the person who is abroad, it is not the 
signing which will make it a stated account, but the person to 
whom it is sent, keeping it by him any length of time, without 
making any objection, which shall bind him, and prevent his 
entering into an open account afterwards. 62 
 
Both Jernegan and Sherman identify the implication of an account stated as 
a rule that applies between merchants.63 In Tickel v. Short, this limitation 
came to be a part of the doctrine; account stated is expressed as a rule of 
chancery and “of merchants.”64 This description is repeated in Freeland v 
Heron, an early United States case of an account stated: 
 
When one merchant sends an account current to another residing 
in a different country, between whom there are mutual dealings, 
and he keeps it two years without making any objections, it shall 
be deemed a stated account, and his silence and acquiescence 
shall bind him. [A]t least so far as to cast the onus probandi on 
him.65 
 
This early string of cases sees a development, from the mercantile custom 
in Sherman to an explicit rule of equity, limited to particular persons 
(merchants) and in particular relationships (mutual dealings). In the early-
                                                                                                                 
 60. Sherman, 23 Eng. Rep. at 276. 
 61. Haddock, supra note 59. 
 62. Willis v. Jernegan, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 555, 555 (Ch.). 
 63. Lord Hardwicke went on to discuss banks and their customers, speaking of record books 
banks gave to customers and vouchers kept for transactions. This discussion was quoted in Shepard v. 
Bank of Missouri to support the expansion of account stated to non- merchants. Shepard v. Bank of Mo., 
15 Mo. 143, 152 (1951). However, Hardwicke’s comments do not relate to modern consumer-bank 
dealings. The banking system was still emerging in England and banks were still largely commercial. 
See generally T.S ASHTON, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND: THE 18TH CENTURY (1955). 
 64. Tickel v. Short, (1750–1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 154, 154 (Ch.). 
 65. Freeland v. Heron, Lenox & Co., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 147, 151 (1812).  
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nineteenth century, it can be stated with fair certainty that account stated 
would not have applied in a consumer action unless—perhaps—there was 
express assent.66 All of these early cases involved the implication of assent 
by a mercantile debtor.  
 Modern treatises reflect the expansion of implied account stated from 
merchants to others in the nineteenth century.67 Generally, the treatises say 
that account stated applies to everyone and that the limitation to merchants 
in the early cases has been abandoned. For example, Corpus Juris 
Secundum (CJS) says, “[t]he doctrine of account stated generally extends to 
all cases where the relation of debtor and creditor exists.”68 Treatises trace 
the abandonment of the merchant requirement to cases ranging from the 
late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. 
 CJS, for example, refers to a California case, Hemenover v. Lynip,69 
which in turn cites an American Decisions note on account stated and a 
New York case, Stenton v. Jerome.70 Stenton itself does not refer to the 
merchant requirement. Hemenover notes the expansion of account stated 
beyond merchants as though it were already a settled matter, but it is 
primarily concerned with the prior debtor-creditor relationship requirement. 
Hemenover expresses doubt about the reach of the implication of account 
stated: 
 
[I]t was never intended that through the mere means of sending 
out a claim that thereby a legal and recoverable demand might be 
created unless the adverse party made prompt and effectual 
denial. The law was intended to preserve and protect legitimate 
demands but not to create obligations independent of prior 
indebtedness.71 
 
 On the basis of cases like Stenton and Hemenover, our treatises present 
unanimity between states about the law on account stated. However, the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Treatises of the day are primarily interested in express account stated. E.g., ANSON, supra 
note 45 (stating that an admission of debt implies a promise to pay); CHITTY 3D., supra note 13, at 198–
99 (claiming that for a plaintiff to recover under account stated when consideration is not proven, the 
account must be unqualifiedly acknowledged); CHITTY 6TH, supra note 13, at 649–50 (providing 
examples of express assent to an amount due); JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS, AND UPON THE DEFENCES TO ACTIONS THEREON 962, 965 (9th Eng. ed. 1874). See 
generally JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (William Henry Rawle & George 
Sharswood eds., 6th Am. ed. 1878) [hereinafter SMITH 5TH] (not mentioning implied account stated at 
all). 
 67. See, e.g., 1A C.J.S. Account Stated § 2 (2005) (understanding that account stated now 
extends to all cases where the relation of creditor and debtor exists). 
 68. 1A C.J.S Account Stated § 3. 
 69. Hemenover v. Lynip, 290 P. 1089, 1091 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930). 
 70. Stenton v. Jerome, 54 N.Y. 480 (1873). 
 71. Hemenover, 290 P. at 1092. 
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expansion of account stated was not uncontroversial in its time.72 
Additionally, the cases cited as abandoning the merchant requirement do 
not clearly articulate that the merchant requirement was actually at issue. A 
useful example is the New York Court of Appeals decision in Rodkinson v. 
Haeker.73 In the case of an attorney suing his client upon an account stated, 
the court interpreted the “merchant and merchant” requirement as an 
element of the account stated generally, not a requirement for implied 
account stated.74 It was not necessary for the court to consider what was or 
was not a requirement for the implication of assent because the facts of the 
case were that the client had expressly promised to pay the debt.75 In these 
circumstances, the court addressed the issue of whether an attorney’s client 
can promise to pay his debt of attorneys’ fees.76  
 Considered in this light, it is unsurprising that the court held in the 
affirmative.77 Many expansion cases seem to have concerned relations 
between attorneys and clients.78 It seems only “common sense”—as it did 
to the court in Shepard v. Bank of Missouri—that anyone could promise to 
pay a debt they had already incurred.79 However, the courts in these cases 
were rejecting a straw man: they read the “merchant requirement” as wider 
than it was, or they confused account stated as a general theory of liability 
with the specific rule of implied account stated.80 The courts treated it as a 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Haddock questioned the wisdom of the expansion: 
 
[I]t is a question whether the old reasoning may not be better entitled to respect 
than the more lax logic of modern times. Among merchants, accounts are 
supposed to be closely looked after at frequent intervals, but among business 
classes not mercantile debits and credits are mutually passed and bills rendered 
with a degree of attention depending largely upon the occupation of the parties. 
 
Haddock, supra note 59; C.f. Doctrine of Account Stated–Between Whom it Applies, 5 VA. L.J. 678, 678 
(1881) (discussing Anding v. Levy, 57 Miss. 51, 63 (1879), and collecting various cases on the issue, 
noting the divergence of opinion). 
 73. See generally Rodkinson v. Haecker, 162 N.E. 493 (N.Y. 1928). 
 74. Id. at 495. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 496. 
 78. E.g., Harris v. Drenning, 168 P. 1106, 1108 (Kan. 1917); Crane v. Stansbury, 161 P. 7, 9 
(Cal. 1916); Gruby v. Smith, 13 Ill. App. 43, 44–5 (1883); Attorney and Client–Does Doctrine of 
Account Stated Apply?, 27 MICH. L. REV. 571, 571 (1929) (citing Griffith v. Hicks, 233 S.W. 1086, 
1087 (Ark. 1921)). But see Ida Cnty. Savings Bank v. Johnson, 136 N.W. 225, 226 (Iowa 1912) 
(involving a bank); Ault v. Interstate Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 47 P. 13, 14 (Wash. 1896) (involving an 
insurance company). 
 79. Shepard v. Bank of Missouri, 15 Mo. 143, 151 (1851) (“[T]here is no reason why the same 
doctrine should not prevail between any other persons, with whom are accounts current or accounts of 
transactions in the ordinary course of business.”). After further discussion, the court described the rule 
as “founded in common sense, and is in accordance with the common course of human experience.” Id. 
at 152. 
 80. Ault, 47 P. at 15; Gruby, 13 Ill. App. at 45. 
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prerequisite of any account stated rather than as a requirement for an 
implication of assent.81  
 While the expansion cases lack precision, later courts, as in 
Hemenover, accepted their reasoning and thought the merchant requirement 
had been abandoned for both express and implied accounts stated.82 Courts 
in states that have explicitly accepted the expansion are unlikely now to 
abandon it because of its problematic foundations, which are ancient history 
for trial judges. 
 Despite the loss of the merchant requirement and the consequent 
expansion of account stated into new territory, the action generally fell into 
disuse after the 1920s. In 1930 it was thought an archaic doctrine,83 and by 
1960 it had reached a low point. Between 1960 and 1970, only 395 cases 
mentioning account stated were reported, compared to 847 at its peak in the 
decade between 1910 and 1920. In the same decade, 1,360 cases mentioned 
quantum meruit.84 Taking the example of Maryland, twenty-eight cases 
mention account stated after 1951. Only one case discusses account stated 
in any detail;85 the others simply mention that it was pled.86  
 From the 1950s until the 1990s, account stated was an obscure cause of 
action. When the courts were faced with it, they often had to refer to 
treatises to find the law,87 and it is probably fair to say that lawyers largely 
                                                                                                                 
 81. However, other cases more clearly abrogate the merchant rule that they rejected. E.g., Ault, 
47 P. at 15. 
 
The old decisions, to the effect that this rule applied only to transactions between 
merchants, have become obsolete; and it is now held to apply to all classes, 
uninfluenced by their relation to each other, except that such relation will be taken 
into consideration in determining as to what is a reasonable time . . . .” 
 
Id. 
 82. See Hemenover v. Lynip, 290 P. 1089, 1092 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930) (understanding that 
account stated no longer just applies to merchant law). 
 83. Edmund O. Belsheim, The Old Action of Account, 45 HARV. L. REV. 466, 466, 471 (1931) 
(tracing account stated to fourteenth century Year Book reports). 
 84. Based on searches performed using LexisNexis “all state and federal” cases database. This 
is, of course, a straw poll. Cases that reach the law reports are not a very accurate reflection of suits filed 
or tried, however, for these purposes, they illustrate the fall of account stated into relative obscurity.  
 85. Balt. Cnty. v. Archway Motors Inc., 370 A.2d 113, 117–18 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977), 
discussed infra Part I.B.3. 
 86. Of the twenty-eight cases, nine use the expression “account stated” in some other sense. 
Four cases involve consumers, and each mentions only that account stated was pled in the original 
complaint. Champion v. United Va. Bank, 589 A.2d 1328, 1328 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (involving 
an appeal by a pro se consumer debt against a judgment for a credit card debt); Edelstein v. Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Co., 250 A.2d 241, 242 (Md. 1968) (involving an action between consumer and 
insurance company); Berwyn Fuel & Feed Co. v. Kolb, 240 A.2d 239, 240 (Md. 1968) (involving an 
action for a debt for fuel oil, in which it is unclear whether the defendant was trading as a consumer or a 
businessman); Gillen v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 333 A.2d 329, 332 (Md. 1975) (hearing the case of a plaintiff 
consumer suing in relation to a withdrawal from his deposit account based on a forgery). 
 87. Onachuk v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., Nos. 87-2206, 87-2207, 1988 WL 132539, at *7 (6th 
Cir. Dec. 13, 1988) (unpublished table decision) (citing Trafton v. Youngblood, 442 P.2d 648, 653–54 
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forgot about account stated.88 In the 1960s, one New York article sought to 
renew interest in the cause of action.89 The real resurrection of account 
stated, however, took place within the past thirteen years, with over 1,900 
reported cases mentioning account stated from 2000 to 2010. This rise 
coincides with increases in household debt and the rise of the secondary 
market for defaulted consumer debt.90  
B. The Three States of Account Stated 
 One problem with the fall of account stated in the mid-twentieth 
century is that some of the distinctiveness of state law has been lost. 
Jurisprudences, sometimes even state jurisprudence, present a pan-
American view of account stated. This section will highlight some of the 
distinctive features of state law in three states: West Virginia, New York, 
and Maryland. These states contrast each other in two important respects. 
First, they have taken different approaches to the merchant requirement 
discussed above: West Virginia expressly retained it, New York expressly 
abandoned it, and Maryland appears not to have an authoritative decision 
on the issue. Second, these states have a different amount of caselaw on 
account stated. In New York, account stated continues its incremental 
development, raising questions about the implied account stated and the 
interaction of account stated and consumer protection statutes. In Maryland, 
few cases deal with account stated, and fewer still in West Virginia. 
1. West Virginia 
 The only modern West Virginia treatise to mention account stated 
states: “[f]ailure to dispute an account rendered after the lapse of a 
reasonable time amounts to an admission of correctness.”91 The treatise 
does not mention the merchant requirement. However, West Virginia’s 
courts explicitly declined to abandon the merchant requirement for implied 
                                                                                                                 
(Cal. 1968)); Keane v. McFee, 275 P.2d 960, 968 (Idaho 1954). Also more recently, for example, Credit 
Trust Corp. v. Richard, No. 99-CA-94, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3027, at *11 (Ct. App. July 7, 2000) 
(quoting 1 Oh. Jur. 3d); see Target Nat’l Bank v. Samanez, No. AR07-009777, Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. 
LEXIS 433, at *7 (Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 19, 2007) (noting the court’s use of treatises to define account 
stated). 
 88. Rosemary E. Bucci, Account Stated Revisited, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 653, 653 (1962) 
(“[O]nly a few cases are found today in the New York reporters, and conversations with attorneys 
indicate that the action is unfamiliar to many of them.”). 
 89. Id. at 659 (“The reasonably clear, simple and equitable rules of this cause of action seem to 
be particularly well adapted to the practice of busy attorneys today . . . .”). 
 90. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 12–13; THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, supra note 
1, at 4. Note however that it also coincides with increasing digitization of court reporting, which may be 
responsible for part of the increase. 
 91. STEPHEN P. MEYER, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR WEST VIRGINIA LAWYERS § 28:7 (2012). 
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account stated  during the expansion period. McGraw v. Traders National 
Bank concerned the implication of an account stated between bankers and 
customers.92 The court said: 
 
It is not pretended that the items in this account were gone over 
and a balance struck and agreed so as to bring the case within the 
rule of this authority; but it is claimed by the bank that, having 
rendered the plaintiff the account, by retaining it without 
objection for so long a time, it became an account stated. This 
seems to be the rule in Virginia and West Virginia, as between 
merchant and merchant, and principal and agent, with mutual 
accounts. But we do not think the rule applicable, as a general 
proposition, to transactions between banker and customer.93  
 
 Unlike the courts in Haeker and Shepard discussed above,94 the 
McGraw court thought that the merchant requirement related to the 
implication of assent, not any account stated at all.95 McGraw was followed 
by Price Hill Colliery Co. v. Pinkney in 1924 and has not been 
overturned.96  
 Neither case was a straightforward consumer collection action. 
McGraw was an action by a customer against a bank to recover $1,000 that 
the customer had paid but did not owe.97 That sum apparently related to a 
bribe that the customer had proposed to the bank, so that he would be 
appointed receiver of a company in debt to the bank.98 The bank 
subsequently went into receivership and the customer sued to recover the 
$1,000.99 The bank objected that the matter was a settled account that could 
not be reopened.100 In order to become a “settled account,” the debt first had 
to be an account stated.101 The court further doubted that the customer had 
retained the account rendered without objection.102 These factors do not 
affect the central reasoning for the retention of the merchant requirement 
quoted above: that assuming an actual reconciliation of accounts between 
consumer and business would be to “pretend.” Having decided that it would 
not imply an account stated based on retention, the court found that it could 
                                                                                                                 
 92. McGraw v. Traders Nat. Bank, 63 S.E. 398, 399 (W. Va. 1908). 
 93. Id. at 400 (citations omitted). 
 94. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
 95. McGraw, 64 S.E. at 400. 
 96. Price Hill Colliery Co. v Pinkney, 122 S.E. 434, 436 (W. Va. 1924). 
 97. McGraw, 63 S.E. at 400. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 401. 
 100. Id. at 400. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 401 (“We do not think, therefore, from these facts and other evidence in the case, that 
the plaintiff can be said to have agreed to or acquiesced in the charge.”). 
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not infer assent from the circumstances outside the implied account stated 
rule.103 
 Pinkney involved a dispute between an employer and employee.104 The 
employee sued to recover unpaid benefits, and the employer defended on 
the grounds that the amounts due to the employee were contained in 
periodic account statements.105 The employer relied on the statements as a 
rendition of account, retained without objection, from which an account 
stated should be implied.106 An account stated would fix the amount owing 
and bar the employee’s claim. Pinkney upholds the McGraw ruling in plain 
terms, rejecting the implication of an account stated outside the merchant-
merchant or principal-agent relationship.107 Pinkney distinguished cases 
referred to by the employer and stated “[n]one of these cases are in conflict 
with the rule laid down in McGraw v. Bank.”108 
 Although their facts differ from modern collection actions, McGraw 
and Pinkney clearly enunciate a limitation on implied account stated. The 
cases upheld the merchant requirement with a limited extension to 
principal-agent relationships, and excluded—expressly in McGraw—banks 
and their customers and—implicitly in Pinkney—employers and 
employees. These cases do not oust account stated from consumer or 
employment cases entirely; they only exclude implied account stated based 
on rendition of an account and retention without objection. These cases 
would not exclude an account stated based on express assent or on real 
assent inferred from the surrounding circumstances. 
 Despite the rule in McGraw, the sparsity of caselaw in West Virginia 
relating to account stated,109 and the lack of any later decision abrogating 
McGraw, the resurrection of account stated has also taken place in West 
Virginia. At least two cases since 2007 have pled account stated in 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. Price Hill Colliery Co. v. Pinkney, 122 S.E. 434, 434 (W. Va. 1924). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 435. 
 107. Id. at 436. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Only five cases since 1950 have mentioned account stated in West Virginia: Vorholt v. 
One Valley Bank, 498 S.E.2d 241, 245–46 (W. Va. 1997) (mentioning account stated in relation to 
limitation dates); Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor, 332 S.E.2d 589, 593–94 (W. Va. 1985) (discussing 
account stated in relation to limitation dates; apparently this case involved business dealings); Bluefield 
Supply Co. v. Frankel’s Appliances, Inc., 142 S.E.2d 898, 898 (W. Va. 1965) (featuring account stated 
in the pleadings without further mention); Preston Cnty. Coke Co. v. Preston Cnty. Light & Power Co., 
119 S.E.2d 420, 431 (W. Va. 1961) (discussing account stated in relation to statute of limitations, but 
specifically avoiding substantial discussion of account stated itself because “such discussion would be 
immaterial, since, if even they are stated accounts, they do not defeat the statute of limitations [because 
they are not acknowledgments in writing].”); Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 90 S.E.2d 
459, 464 (W. Va. 1955) (mentioning account stated in a discussion of pleading). 
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consumer collection complaints.110 Both appear to have been successful.111 
Because trial level collection complaints are not usually found on electronic 
databases, there are likely to be many similar cases. Account stated has 
been resurrected, at least partially, in West Virginia even though its use in 
consumer actions is impermissible under McGraw and Pinkney.  
 Of the three jurisdictions examined here, West Virginia has the least 
modern caselaw. Its cases relate almost exclusively to the effect of an 
account stated upon the statute of limitations.112 Extended discussion of the 
nature of account stated in West Virginia is therefore not useful or possible 
here. The West Virginia courts have some latitude to rely on the 
jurisprudence of other states, works of reference, and the old cases.113 While 
they may one day overturn McGraw and Pinkney, the law in West Virginia 
seems clear until they do. 
2. New York 
 The experience of New York has been markedly different from that of 
West Virginia. Some of the cases often cited in support of the expansion of 
account stated are New York cases of the late nineteenth century.114 
Rosemary Bucci’s 1962 article, Account Stated Revisited,115 appeared in a 
New York law review and drew primarily on New York caselaw. Bucci 
thought it odd that account stated was not commonly used to collect unpaid 
accounts, given that “[t]he advantages of this action which made it popular 
under the law merchant in England do not seem to be any less desirable 
today.”116 
 It is unsurprising that the resurrection of account stated is strong in 
New York given Bucci’s encouragement and the continued appearance of 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Complaint at 1, Cach, LLC v. Wagner, No. 07-C-2177, 2007 WL 5964644 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 
Oct. 12, 2007); Complaint at 1, Cach, LLC v. Anthony, No. 07-C-2309, 2007 WL 5964653 (W. Va. Cir. 
Ct. Oct. 25, 2007).  
 111. See Cach, LLC v. Wagner, No. 07-C-2177, 2008 WL 5506590 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 
2008) (granting plaintiff’'s motion for summary judgment although it is unclear how fully this case was 
argued); see also, Cach, LLC. v. Anthony, No. 07-C-2309, 2008 WL 5506596 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 7, 
2008) (granting Plaintiff default judgment). 
 112. See cases cited supra note 110. 
 113. For example, in Greer Limestone the court finds support for the proposition that “[i]n the 
case of an account stated, the statute of limitations runs from the date it was stated” in cases from 
Arkansas, Colorado and New York as well as American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum. 
Greer Limestone, 332 S.E.2d at 593. See generally Hoover-Dimeling Lumber Co. v. Neill, 87 S.E. 855 
(W. Va. 1916) (noting the lack of relevant in-state caselaw precedent cited by the court). 
 114. E.g., Stenton v. Jerome, 54 N.Y. 480, 484–85 (1873); Rodkinson v. Haecker, 162 N.E. 
493, 495–96 (N.Y. 1928). 
 115. See Bucci, supra note 88, at 653–59 (“[Account stated] has been long recognized and 
sanctioned by the New York courts . . . .”); see also supra note 90 and accompanying text (quoting 
Bucci’s view of account stated as a favorable doctrine). 
 116. Bucci, supra note 88. 
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account stated in New York courts.117 Since 2000, New York has seen a 
number of reported consumer collection actions using the account stated 
theory. The courts of New York have endorsed the use of account stated in 
collection actions.118 These developments have maintained account stated 
as a living area of law, which continues to develop through the work of 
New York appellate courts.119 These decisions are a mixed bag for 
consumers: some are adverse, not just to the individual debtors involved, 
but to the protection of consumers more widely.120 New York has accepted 
the evidence-reducing function of implied account stated and elevated it to 
the raison d’etre of account stated as a whole.121 
i. Outline of Account Stated in New York 
 New York courts construe account stated as “an agreement between 
parties to an account based upon prior transactions between them with 
respect to the correctness of the account items and balance due.”122 New 
York also accepts the doctrine of retention without objection, and through 
this implied account stated the Plaintiff’s burden of proof can be reduced.123 
If a plaintiff can demonstrate retention without objection for an 
“unreasonable” period of an account statement, the plaintiff has a prima 
facie case on an account stated theory.124 As noted above, the merchant 
requirement has been expressly abandoned in New York.125 
 New York caselaw addressing the “reasonable period” is sparse. Most 
cases simply give a conclusory statement: the Plaintiff either has or has not 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Account stated cases continued to appear in New York’s reporters more frequently than 
those of West Viriginia or Maryland. E.g., Gurney, Becker & Bourne, Inc. v. Benderson Dev. Co., 394 
N.E.2d 282, 282 (N.Y. 1979); Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th & 3d Corp., 227 N.E.2d 30, 32 (N.Y. 
1967); Tantillo v. Giglio, 549 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432–33 (App. Div. 1989). 
 118. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d 301, 303 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2000). 
 119. For example, New York has developed doctrine as to the application of the statute of 
limitations to account stated: “The statute of limitations on an action for account stated is six 
years . . . [t]he cause of action accrues at the time of the last transaction on the account.” Velocity Invs. 
LLC v. McCaffrey, 921 N.Y.S.2d 799, 804 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2011) (citing Erdheim v. Gelfman, 
757 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (App. Div. 2003)); Hertzberg & Sanchez, P.C. v. Friendship Dairies Inc., 14 
Misc. 3d 136(A) (N.Y. App. Term 2007); 75 N.Y. JUR. 2D Limitations and Laches § 90 (2013) 
(providing that the cause of action does not accrue on an entire contract until the “completion or 
substantial completion of the services, or the last services were rendered”). 
 120. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (App. Term 2000), discussed 
infra. 
 121. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d at 302. 
 122. Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Brown-Serulovic, 948 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (App. Div. 2012) 
(quoting Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Cutler, 916 N.Y.S.2d 622, 622 (App. Div. 2011)). 
 123. Discover Bank v. Sura, No. CV-11-3421, 2012 WL 1450028, at *3 (Poughkeepsie City Ct. 
Apr.26, 2012) (“Plaintiff does not have to submit a signed copy of an agreement in order to prevail on a 
motion for summary judgment based upon the account stated . . . .”). 
 124. Id. (citing Discover Bank v. Williamson, 14 Misc. 3d 136A (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)). 
 125. See supra Part I.B. 
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shown retention without objection within a reasonable period.126 This is to 
be expected for two reasons: first, New York doctrine makes the period a 
matter of fact rather than of law.127 Second, consumers facing collection 
actions rarely defend them.128 It is correspondingly unlikely that a consumer 
will object to a statement of account at any stage.  
 Evidence of periodic rendering of account stated is one area of the 
doctrine in which the New York courts appear to have increased the proof 
requirements. This requirement is not explicitly expressed, but appears 
from the language of courts addressing the required standards of proof: 
“Defendants also claim [the bank] did not render monthly statements to 
Defendants and thus cannot maintain a claim for account stated.”129 The 
courts seem to consider the failure to render monthly statements a 
reasonable defense. 
ii. A New Rule of Implication?—Part Payment 
 Part payment has a role in several areas of debt collection law, 
particularly the tolling of the statute of limitations by acknowledgment of 
the debt130 and the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.131 However, part 
payment was not an element of the traditional formula for the inference of 
account stated, which spoke only of retention without objection.  
                                                                                                                 
 126. E.g., Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Gabay, 94 A.D.3d 795, 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); 
Scheichet & Davis, P.C. v. Nohavicka, 939 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (App. Div. 2012); Am. Express 
Centurion Bank v. Williams, 807 N.Y.S.2d 612, 613 (App. Div. 2005); Providian Nat’l Bank v. 
Forrester, 716 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (App. Div. 2000); Discover Bank v. Robinson, 24 Misc. 3d 126, 126 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 127. Yannelli, Zevin & Civardi v. Sakol, 749 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (App. Div. 2002) (“Whether a 
bill has been held without objection for a period of time sufficient to give rise to an inference of assent, 
in light of all the circumstances presented, is ordinarily a question of fact, and becomes a question of 
law only in those cases where only one inference is rationally possible.”) (quoting Legum v. Ruthen, 
621 N.Y.S.2d 649, 651 (App. Div. 1995)). 
 128. See Spector, supra note 24 (concluding that only 20% of consumers attempted to respond 
to lawsuits). 
 129. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Economical Realty, LLC, No. 25597/08, 2010 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 4035, at *6 (Sup. Ct. July 29, 2010). 
 130. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Necessity and Sufficiency, in Order to Toll Statute of 
Limitations as to Debt, of Statement of Amount of Debt in Acknowledgment or New Promise to Pay, 21 
A.L.R.4th 1121 (1983) (annotating cases that interpret the statute of limitations on a debt in light of an 
acknowledgement of that debt); C.C. Marvel, Part Payment or Promise to Pay Judgment as Affecting 
the Running of Statute of Limitations, 45 A.L.R.2d 967, 974 (1956). Many state codes expressly provide 
that acknowledgment tolls the statute of limitations. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 360 (West 2012). 
 131. See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Modern Status of Rule that Acceptance of Check Purporting to be 
Final Settlement of Disputed Amount Constitutes Accord and Satisfaction, 42 A.L.R.4th 12, 65 (1985) 
(discussing a series of cases in which a check that was explicitly tendered as full payment constituted 
accord and satisfaction, even though the creditors attempted to accept the tender only as partial 
payment). 
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 In New York, part payment is now evidence from which an inference 
of assent can—but need not—be drawn.132 The first signs of this 
development are found in Lockwood v. Thorne in 1854.133 The Lockwood 
court explained its rationale clearly: the payment of the balance amounted 
to assent.134 In that case the debtor paid the exact sum demanded.135 Courts 
now sometimes find part payment as a justification or partial justification of 
an inference of account stated.136 Caselaw is unclear as to whether the part 
payment must be substantial. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Brown-
Serulovic concerned disputed charges on a credit card. The plaintiff failed 
to establish retention without objection, but also submitted as evidence 
checks received in part payment of the debt from which the court could 
infer assent.137 The court found only one check relevant and said “the sum 
of $300, only reflected a small proportion of the debt owed at the time, 
approximately $19,000, and by itself, did not create an inference of 
assent.”138 Courts have found sums less than the whole amount of the debt 
sufficient to imply an account stated in other contexts, as in Galbreath-
Ruffin Corp. v. 40th & 3rd Corp.139 Like the issue of the “reasonable 
period,” the inference from part payment continues to be treated more as an 
issue of fact than of law.140 Despite this, the inference from part payment is 
very different from the implication from rendition and retention without 
objection, which is a matter of course.141 The significance of inference from 
part payment for the theoretical foundations of account stated is discussed 
in Part I.C below. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. at 68; Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Cutler, 916 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (App. Div. 2011) 
(“An agreement may be implied where a defendant retains bills without objecting to them within a 
reasonable period of time, or makes partial payment on the account.”) (emphasis added)); see also 
Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th & 3d Corp., 227 N.E.2d 30, 36 (N.Y. 1967) (inferring intent form partial 
payment).  
 133. Lockwood v. Thorne, 11 N.Y. 170, 175 (1854).  
 134. Id. at 175 (“Here is then affirmative and I think conclusive evidence that . . . the plaintiffs 
agreed to it as a stated account, by drawing for and receiving the precise balance admitted.”).  
 135. Account stated was raised not to collect a debt but in an attempt to forestall the plaintiff’s 
attempts to challenge the correctness of the amount paid. 
 136. E.g., Discover Bank v. Williamson, No. 2006-1007, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 337 (App. 
Div. Feb. 2, 2007); Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Goldberg, No. 2007-1953, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2086, at 
*3 (App. Div. Aug. 10, 2009); Cutler, 916 N.Y.S.2d at 623 (2011). 
 137. Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Brown-Serulovic, 948 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (App. Div. 2012). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th & 3d Corp., 227 N.E.2d 30, 36 (N.Y. 1967) (“Defendants 
have paid substantial amounts on account of each claim for overriding commissions, and are thereby 
precluded at this late date from contending that no overriding commissions became payable . . . .”). 
 140. See id. (referring to partial payments as “evidentiary facts”). 
 141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 282 (1979) (“Retention without objection for 
an unreasonably long time . . . is a manifestation of assent.”). 
360 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 38:339 
 
iii. The Independence of Account Stated and Consumer Protection Law 
 As noted above, an action based on account stated is treated as distinct 
from an action for breach of contract, which gave rise to the underlying 
debt. Account stated may succeed where breach of contract fails. Account 
stated is, however, tied to the underlying debt and cannot succeed where 
there is no debt. How far account stated may be separated from the 
underlying source of the debt is important because account stated may be 
used to circumvent consumer protection measures. Trial courts in New 
York have addressed this problem in two cases and have reached 
conflicting conclusions. 
 Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Poynton is a short judgment.142 It 
rejected oppositions to motions for summary judgment based upon two 
statutory consumer protection provisions: 15 U.S.C. § 1643(b)143 (Federal 
Truth in Lending Act provision) and New York General Business Law 
section 517.144 The court explains that account stated is an independent 
cause of action, and neither an “action by a card issuer to enforce liability 
for the use of the credit card” under the Federal Truth in Lending Act nor a 
contractual provision caught under the New York law.145 In support of this 
proposition, Poynton cites W.R. Haughton Training Stables, Inc. v. Mariam 
Farms, Inc., and Werner v. Nelkin. Werner is a very short affirming 
judgment that makes no statement of law.146 Haughton simply states that 
“[a]n account stated constitutes in effect a separate agreement between the 
parties that the debt is valid and due.”147 Poynton represents an extreme 
case of separation, in which account stated is not “an action . . . to enforce 
liability for the use of the credit card” even though the underlying debt is a 
credit card debt, and its enforcement is the practical goal of the action.148 
Poynton supports the proposition that creditors can circumvent consumer 
protection laws by suing on an account stated theory, rather than a breach of 
contract theory.149 
 At the same time as Poynton, the relationship between account stated 
and consumer protection statutes was examined elsewhere in New York, in 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Term 2000). 
 143. Stating that the burden of proof in any action by a card issuer to enforce liability for the use 
of a credit card is upon the card issuer to show that the use was authorized. 
 144. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 517 (McKinney 1977) (“No agreement between the issuer and the 
holder shall contain any provision that a statement sent by the issuer to the holder shall be deemed 
correct unless objected to within a specified period of time. Any such provision is against public policy 
and shall be of no force or effect.”). 
 145. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (App. Term 2000). 
 146. Werner v. Nelkin, 614 N.Y.S.2d 66, 66 (App. Div. 1994). 
 147. W.R. Haughton Training Stables, Inc. v. Miriam Farms, Inc., 499 N.Y.S.2d 792, 793 (App. 
Div. 1986). 
 148. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 328. 
 149. Id. 
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Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Jones.150 The provisions at issue in Jones 
were the same New York business law considered in Poynton, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692g(c), and a federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) 
provision prohibiting an inference of liability from a consumer’s silence 
when sent a demand for payment by a debt collector.151 Jones held that the 
New York law’s function was to prohibit businesses from specifying the 
“reasonable time” after receipt of a statement that would establish an 
account stated.152 Regarding the FDCPA provision, Jones held that it did 
not apply to original creditors such as the plaintiff.153 As a result, a 
statement of account from an original creditor can give rise to an account 
stated, while a statement of account from a debt collector cannot.154 Jones 
reaches the same result as Poynton, without relying on the independence of 
account stated.155 
 Surprisingly, neither case appears to have considered Bank of New 
York-Delaware v. Santarelli, which dealt with the same issues as Poynton 
but held the opposite.156 The court held that “it is evident that regardless of 
the technical label placed upon it, it is in fact an ‘action by a card issuer to 
enforce liability for the use of a credit card’” within the meaning of 15 
U.S.C. § 1643(b).157 The court also found that the intent of both that 
provision and the New York law was “to thrust the burden upon the card 
issuer to demonstrate the full basis of its cardholder's liability, and not to 
allow it to hide behind pleadings couched in generalities and framed in 
terms of technical common law forms of action.”158 Parsons v. Batchelor159 
similarly held against the Poynton logic, stating: 
 
The account stated can only determine the amount of the debt 
where a liability exists, and will not be permitted . . . to create a 
liability where none existed before. Merely changing the form of 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2000) 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(c) (2012)). 
 151. Id. at 302. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 303 (citing Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart, Inc. v. Dowling, 703 N.Y.S.2d 
362 (Civ. Ct. 1999)). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. (finding an account stated without addressing the independence of accounts stated); 
see also Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (App. Term 2000) (citing the court’s 
reliance on the independence of account stated). 
 156. See Bank of N.Y.-Del. v. Santarelli, 491 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (Greene Cnty. Ct. 1985) 
(noting that plaintiff’s claim is “an action by a card issuer to enforce liability for the use of a credit card” 
as defined under the Federal Truth in Lending Act (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 982. 
 159. Parsons v. Batchelor, 253 N.Y.S. 728, 730 (App. Div. 1931). 
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the action to evade the bar of the statute creates no new 
liability.160 
 
 The logic of Poynton presents a clear threat to consumer protection. Its 
threat lies in treating account stated as an entirely separate basis upon which 
to hold the defendant consumer liable. By calling account stated a “separate 
cause of action,” the court allows itself and the plaintiff to ignore the real 
source of liability, which in this case is the use of the credit card.161 
Whether the plaintiff chooses a breach of contract theory or an account 
stated theory, he is still suing for the payment of a credit card debt, which is 
ultimately what consumer protection laws seek to address, as held in 
Santarelli.162 If account stated is interpreted as an entirely separate cause of 
action, which is itself a source of liability, then any statutory protection 
directed towards the underlying contract can be circumvented. 
 The Jones court reasoned differently, basing its decision on a narrow 
reading of the purpose of the statutes rather than on the unique identity of 
the action for account stated.163 Jones preserves account stated in cases 
where (1) the consumer expressly agrees and promises to pay the amount of 
the debt, or (2) the plaintiff is the original creditor.164 Only debt buyers who 
rely upon a debt collection letter as a rendition of account would be barred 
by the FDCPA provision, as interpreted by Jones.165 Whether the plaintiff is 
the original creditor, Jones protects the “reasonable period” test for 
retention without objection from contractual alternation by a creditors’ 
standard form contract, on the ground that it is the specification of a period 
which is prohibited under the New York General Business Law.166  
 Jones does not address part payment, the alternative source for implied 
account stated in New York as discussed above. Part payment would not be 
caught by the FDCPA prohibition discussed in Jones, because it does not 
draw an inference from silence.167  
 The Jones decision is most likely to be followed in jurisdictions which 
are protective of old common law rules.168 The Poynton decision has not 
attracted much attention, and, of the two, is the most objectionable. Jones is 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. 
 161. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d at 328; see id. 
 162. Bank of N.Y.-Del., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 982. 
 163. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d 301, 303 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2000). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 302–03. 
 167. See id. at 302 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g) (2012)). 
 168. See Rachel Hinkle, New York Court Rejects FDCPA Statutory Pre-emption of “Account 
Stated” Doctrine in Consumer Transactions Citibank v. Jones, 2 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 35, 
35 (2001) (deducing Tennessee’s likelihood to adopt the common law doctrine of “accounts stated” 
instead of a contrary interpretation of federal statute). 
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problematic because of its statutory interpretation, not because of its 
explanation of account stated. 
 The independence of account stated has one positive effect: the 
separation of account stated from the underlying contract prevents reliance 
upon contract terms—in the absence of proof of the contract. Claims for 
contractual interest or attorneys’ fees are problematic under an account 
stated theory because account stated is “independent of any contract 
provision.”169 This is so, even without taking the independence of account 
stated to the extreme of Poynton. Indeed, plaintiffs relying on account 
stated will face practical difficulties in reaching contractual interest and 
attorneys’ fees. The additional evidence needed to show a contractual 
entitlement to either would be just the proof the plaintiff avoids by relying 
on account stated. 
iv. Conclusions on Account Stated in New York 
 Account stated is alive and well in New York. It continues to develop 
in its role as a collection tool utilized by creditors to reduce the evidentiary 
burden they bear. Some of this development may be positive and may 
ultimately improve the doctrine. The rules governing the implication of 
account stated have continued to expand in ways which take account stated 
away from its narrower origins; in particular, the development that account 
stated can be implied from part payment. The uncertainty expressed in 
some of these cases demonstrates a fresh reflection on the circumstances in 
which account stated ought to be inferred. These issues will be further 
explored below in Part II.B and Part III.  
 New York has also seen a less positive change. The “separate cause of 
action” approach of Poynton represents a threat to statutory regimes that 
seek to regulate collection actions and, if more widely accepted, could lead 
to the use of account stated to enforce contracts which are themselves 
flawed or illegal. 
3. Maryland 
 Maryland’s appellate courts have rarely addressed account stated, 
following the wider pattern of mid-twentieth century decline. However, 
there is some indication that account stated continued in use through 
attorneys specializing in debt collection; a 1983 bar journal article, 
Confessions of a Collections Lawyer, indicates that account stated was in 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Martin, 807 N.Y.S.2d 284, 293 (N.Y. Cnty. Civ. Ct. 2005) (citing 
Citibank S.D., N.A. v. Caputo, 8 Misc. 3d 131(A) (N.Y. App. Term 2005)). 
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use and particularly associated with credit card collection actions.170 If 
account stated remained alive in the district courts, it rarely attracted 
attention in reported cases.  
 Maryland’s experience falls in the middle ground between West 
Virginia and New York. Maryland has no case similar to McGrath or 
Pinkney. Similarly, no Maryland case removes the merchant requirement 
like Haeker. Whether Maryland practitioners contemporaneously accepted 
the trend in other states to abandon the merchant requirement will probably 
remain unknown, because no case of an implied account stated exists 
between a consumer and a business.171 While Maryland has seen more 
recent cases than West Virginia, each was essentially a commercial case in 
which account stated was a second or third cause of action.172 Those cases 
that discuss account stated (beyond simply noting that it was pled) elucidate 
the basic elements but tell us little about the circumstances in which an 
account stated can be implied. The three leading cases are Wathen v. 
Pearce,173 Baltimore County v. Archway Motors,174 and Miller v. Pyrites 
Co., Inc.175 
 The case generally identified as establishing account stated as a distinct 
cause of action in Maryland is Lyell v. Walbach.176 The case is also the 
nearest that Maryland has come to a reasoned decision on an account stated 
between a business and a layman. Lyell concerned a debt for groceries.177 
The court described account stated as an admission of a debt owing, from 
which a promise to pay was implied.178 It noted the contemporary practice 
of pleading account stated in every debt action based upon a contract, 
except actions against children.179 The court commented parenthetically that 
children cannot by law state an account.180 From these facts, the nature of 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Cynthia B. Malament, Confessions of a Collections Lawyer, 10 LITIG. 18, 18 (1983) (“The 
cause of action is usually contract or, for credit card debt, accounts stated . . . . The language used is 
straight from the hornbook.”). 
 171. As noted above there are four consumer collection cases in the post-1950 period. However, 
none of those cases resulted in any discussion of account stated.  
 172. See Haddock, supra note 59. 
 173. Wathen v. Pearce, 3 A.2d 486, 491 (Md. 1939). 
 174. Balt. Cnty. v. Archway Motors Inc., 370 A.2d 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). 
 175. Miller v. Pyrites Co., 71 F.2d 804, 810 (4th Cir. 1934) (quoting Balt. & O.R. Co. v. 
Berkeley Springs & P.R. Co., 168 F. 770, 775 (C.C.N.D.W. Va. 1909)).  
 176. Lyell v. Walbach, 75 A. 339, 341 (Md. 1909). 
 177. Id. at 340. 
 178. Id. at 341.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. This rule may, in fact, be related to the merchant rule. John William Smith, in The Law 
of Contracts connects the inability of an infant to be bound by bills of exchange to the law merchant and 
the exclusion of children from the class of “merchants” and goes on to explain: “[a]gain, [the child] 
cannot bind himself by stating an account . . . . Indeed, in many instances, the statement of an account 
often requires so very large a share of that kind of knowledge which is derived from actual experience 
alone . . . .” SMITH 5TH, supra note 66, at 295–96. 
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the debt sued, the court’s acceptance of the suit, and the exclusion of 
children—but not others—from account stated may seem to suggest that the 
court in Lyell, like other courts in the same period, had abandoned the 
merchant requirement.181 However, Lyell is a case of an express admission 
of debt rather than one implied from retention without objection.182 
Therefore, it did not need to confront the merchant requirement. Further, 
the court’s reference to children being unable to state an account was 
clearly just an example; a second appeal in the same case reached the Court 
of Appeals in 1910 and was decided on the grounds that this particular 
defendant could not state an account under a statute.183 
 The 1934 case of Miller v. Pyrites was a complex commercial dispute 
heard in the federal courts, concerning the debts of a Maryland company.184 
Although the court cited Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Berkeley 
Springs & Potomac Railway Co.185 for the proposition that the assent 
necessary to account stated can be inferred “where no denial of it is made 
within a reasonable time,”186 the court found that there had been an express 
adjustment of accounts between the creditor and debtor.187 Indeed, because 
the case did not involve unliquidated damages, account stated could not 
have been used without an express settlement.188 
 Wathen v. Pearce in 1939 concerned a dispute between co-partners in a 
shipping business.189 The case may at first be seen as an expansion of 
account stated from its merchant roots, but this impression is misleading. 
The appellant in Wathen argued that no action could be brought at all 
between co-owners.190 The court found that actions for account were an 
exception to this rule, and drew into this exception actions for account 
stated.191 By this time, however, account stated had long separated from 
actions of account and in Maryland had been identified as a distinct 
common law cause of action.192 Wathen is not, therefore, an expansion case 
as described above. If it expands account stated at all, it is only to the case 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Lyell, 75 A. at 341. 
 182. Id. (setting out the facts, including two separate admissions and promises to pay). 
 183. The defendant was a married woman at the time the account was alleged to have been 
stated. At the time, a Maryland statute voided the contracts of married women. Lyell, 77 A. at 1112. 
 184. Miller v. Pyrites Co., 71 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1934). 
 185. Balt. & O.R. Co. v. Berkeley Springs & P.R. Co., 168 F. 770, 775 (C.C.N.D.W. Va. 1909). 
 186. Miller, 71 F.2d at 810 (quoting Balt. & O.R. Co., 168 F. at 775). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Wathen v. Pearce, 3 A.2d 486, 488 (Md. 1939). 
 190. Id. at 490. 
 191. Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Conine, 28 Md. 635, 641 (1868)) (relying, in turn, upon an 
English statute).  
 192. See id. at 490–91 (holding that an account stated action may proceed against a co-owner 
because actions of “account shall and may be brought . . . by one joint tenant . . . against the 
other . . . for receiving more than comes to his just share” (quoting Hamilton, 28 Md. at 641)). 
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of co-owners. Wathen is now generally cited for its rulings on the proof of 
trade practices, not for account stated.193 
 Baltimore County v. Archway is Maryland’s most recent and 
significant appellate case on account stated. It concerned a dispute between 
Baltimore County and a developer, Archway Motors, about the construction 
of a water main that Archway requested.194 Baltimore County estimated a 
price and tendered the construction contract.195 After receiving bids, 
Baltimore County asked Archway for a contribution much greater than the 
original estimate, which Archway refused to pay.196 Baltimore County 
nevertheless built the water main and sued Archway on breach of contract 
and account stated theories.197 Unlike the previous cases, this case focused 
upon the rule of implication.198 The court construed the rule of implication, 
not quite as an implied agreement but an implied admission.199 Under 
“appropriate circumstances” the rule of implication could provide a cause 
of action, but in Baltimore County v. Archway the circumstances were 
inappropriate because there was no pre-existing liability.200 The account 
stated theory and the contractual theory both failed because Archway had 
never approved the bid.201  
 Are “appropriate circumstances” in Baltimore County v. Archway 
limited to whether or not there is an underlying, original debt upon which 
the account stated is based? I argue that the court’s words should not be 
read so narrowly. A number of factors are relevant to the implication of 
                                                                                                                 
 193. E.g., Hirsch-Chemie Ltd. v. Johns Hopkins Univ., No. 94-2010, 1995 WL 424929, at *8 
(4th Cir. July 20, 1995); Brass Metal Prods., Inc. v. E-J Enters., Inc., 984 A.2d 361, 380 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2008); Cook v. Sherry, 299 A.2d 811, 813 (Md. 1973) (citing Wathen to conclude that the 
probationary period in police department is not so definite that knowledge of it could be presumed). 
 194. Balt. Cnty. v. Archway Motors Inc., 370 A.2d 113, 114 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). 
 195. Id. at 114–15. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 115. 
 198. Id. at 118. 
 199. Id. at 117–18. 
 
We agree that in order to maintain a cause of action on an account stated, all that 
need be shown is an admission that the stated sum of money constitutes a present 
existing debt. Such admission need not be express, but may be inferred. Thus 
under appropriate circumstances, a failure within a reasonable time to object to 
the correctness of a stated sum may be regarded as an admission of liability. 
 
Id. But subsequently, the court relies upon cases which use the more common “implied agreement” or 
“implied assent” formulation. Id. 
 200. Id. at 118 (“[B]ecause the condition precedent created by § 25 was not fulfilled, Archway 
never became liable under the agreement. Under these circumstances, an inference that Archway's 
failure to object within a year constituted an admission of its liability cannot be employed.”). 
 201. Id. 
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assent (or admission) which were not at issue: the legality of the underlying 
debt or indeed the merchant requirement itself.202 
 Like other jurisdictions, Maryland has seen a flood of collection 
actions, in which many cases are brought by debt buyers rather than 
original creditors.203 Unlike most other jurisdictions, Maryland has adopted 
new procedural rules to ensure that collecting plaintiffs provide adequate 
evidence of their claims to courts and that the courts have clear guidance 
about the evidence they should demand from collecting plaintiffs.204 At first 
sight, these sensible steps by the Rules Committee may appear to trump the 
burden-reducing effect of the account stated doctrine. However, this is not 
necessarily so because the Rules Committee does not exist to reform 
substantive law.205 The rule change simply alters the evidence required for 
Maryland’s equivalent of a default judgment—the affidavit judgment.206 
 The “independence” aspect of account stated, which gave the New 
York courts difficulty in Poynton, may create difficulty about the evidence 
required by the new rules. For example, Rule 3-306(c)(4)(D) requires “if 
the claim is founded upon a note, security agreement, or other instrument, 
the original or a photocopy of the executed instrument, or a sworn or 
certified copy, unless the absence thereof is explained in the affidavit.”207 It 
could be argued that account stated is not a claim founded on any of those 
instruments, even if the underlying debt was. A bold creditor might even 
claim that an action for account stated does not relate to a consumer debt. A 
consumer debt is defined by Rule 3-306(a)(3) as “a secured or unsecured 
debt that is for money owed or alleged to be owed and arises from a 
consumer transaction.”208 The argument being that an account stated is not a 
consumer transaction, but an independent cause of action and, therefore, an 
account stated suit should not be subject to the effects of the new rule. This 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See Lyell v. Walbach, 77 A. 1111, 1112 (Md. 1910) (denying a claim on accounts stated 
against a party who was legally unable to contract for the purchase of goods); see supra notes 176–183 
and accompanying text. 
 203. STATE COLLECTION AGENCY LICENSING BD. & OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF MD., 
AMENDMENTS TO THE MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE IN CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION CASES 2 
(2011), available at http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/Exec/DLLR/HB358Ch332%288%29_ 
2011.pdf. 
 204. MD. R. 3-306(d) (West 2013). 
 205. A committee note to Rule 3-306(d)(2)(B) makes clear that “[t]his Rule is procedural only, 
and subsection (d)(2)(B)(iii) is not intended to address the substantive issue of whether interest in any 
amount may be charged on a part of the charge-off balance that, under applicable and enforceable 
Maryland law, may be regarded as interest”. While the note is directed at one specific provision, it is 
true of the whole rule: it is not determinative of substantive issues. MD. R. 3-306(d). 
 206. MD. R. 3-306(b). 
 207. MD. R. 3-306(c)(4)(d). 
 208. MD. R. 3-306(a)(3). 
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argument is conceptually similar to that in Citibank v. Poynton, and just as 
dangerous.209 
 Such an argument should not be accepted because it would frustrate the 
purpose of the Rule 3-306 amendments, which ensure that complaints based 
on consumer debt are accompanied by adequate evidence.210 Because Rule 
3-306 is fundamentally a rule about pleading, specifying the documentation 
necessary for the court to grant a judgment in default, ex parte, and because 
few consumers respond to debt collection suits, the burden of judging such 
an argument would fall upon district court judges and their clerks. In this 
situation there is the risk that different district courts within Maryland will 
reach different conclusions and, until a contested case raises the issue, there 
will be no authoritative resolution. 
 The new rules may conflict with account stated doctrine on one other 
point; Rule 3-306(d)(1) requires the plaintiff in some cases to provide either 
a writing signed by the debtor, evidencing the debt, or statement of account 
which shows some actual use of the account by the defendant.211 A plaintiff 
cannot simply provide, for example, the last credit card statement sent to 
the defendant, showing that they owe money, but not showing any 
transactions on the card.212 Normally, such a statement would be sufficient 
to found an account stated because generally, it would be a rendition of 
account. The best solution to this conflict is to say that a final statement, 
showing no transactions, is not sufficient evidence of the “prior 
transactions” element of account stated, but even this solution requires 
clarification of the substantive law on account stated. 
 The potential conflict between the procedural rules and the doctrine of 
account stated raises another issue: is account stated really substantive law 
at all? Some argue that Maryland abolished account stated with the 
abolition of common law pleading in 1984.213 While account stated 
certainly has a procedural aspect, the argument is problematic in Maryland 
because, as early as 1909, account stated was regarded as a cause of action 
and therefore a part of substantive law.214 Pleading for “money due on an 
                                                                                                                 
 209. See supra Part I.B.2(iii); see generally Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d 327 
(App. Term 2000) (understanding the conceptual argument made in said case). 
 210. STATE COLLECTION AGENCY LICENSING BD. & OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF 
MD., supra note 203, at 2. 
 211. MD. R. 3-306(d)(1) applies to cases where a debt-buyer is the plaintiff and is seeking to 
collect on purchased consumer debts. MD. R. 3-306(d)(2)(A) requires a copy of the terms and conditions 
of the underlying contract, but an exemption is provided where the original creditor was a federally 
regulated financial institution. MD. R. 3-306(d)(2)(B). Since most sales of defaulted consumer debt are 
by such institutions, few cases are likely to be caught by Rule 3-306(d)(2)(A). See STRUCTURE AND 
PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 13 (the major source of debts for debt buyers is “charged-off” accounts—
charging off is required under federal regulations). 
 212. MD. R. 3-306(1). 
 213. See supra note 26. 
 214. Lyell v. Walbach, 75 A. 339, 341 (Md. 1909). 
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account stated” is contrary to the modern demand for fact pleading and the 
absence of common law formality.215 However, the underlying rule of 
account stated, as part of substantive law, must still exist. 
II.  PROBLEMS OF ACCOUNT STATED IN MODERN CONSUMER ACTIONS 
 In the fifty years since Bucci “revisited” account stated in New York, 
account stated has been resurrected nationwide. This Part will outline the 
resurrection of account stated and argue that the resurrection is harmful to 
consumers and contrary to good consumer protection policy. The implied 
assent in implied account stated is bad for consumers for three reasons. 
First, the implication does not reflect reality: a consumer’s failure to dispute 
a bill does not equate, in the mind of the consumer or the business, to an 
agreement that the bill is accurate and a promise to pay it. This is simply an 
archaic fiction. Second, the implication does not reflect the consumer’s 
expectation on entering into a transaction. It is not a rule or an accepted 
practice among consumers that ignoring a bill is the same as agreeing that it 
is right. Third, the implication places an unreasonable burden on consumers 
to determine if a bill is correct. A consumer would need mathematical and 
legal knowledge, not to mention time and expense, which they do not 
possess. Finally, particular interpretations of account stated undermine 
consumer protection, not only at the collection stage but potentially at the 
transaction stage as well. Interpretations such as that in Citibank v. Poynton, 
discussed above, threaten to provide creditors with an opportunity to collect 
on an account, despite statutory prohibitions arising because of the way in 
which the original transaction was conducted.216 
A. The Resurrection 
 The widespread resurrection of account stated is hard to quantify. State 
court collection actions at the trial level do not usually reach legal databases 
such as LexisNexis; and publicly accessible state court case management 
systems do not usually record the causes of action pled in a complaint in a 
searchable form. Empirical evidence of the resurrection is therefore 
generally lacking. However, the resurrection can be illustrated using the 
number of reported cases. In the LexisNexis database, the number of cases 
mentioning both “account stated” and “credit card” increased from 14 
                                                                                                                 
 215. The appropriate challenge to such a plea would therefore seem to be that the pleading is 
itself deficient. 
 216. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (App. Term 2000). 
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between 1990 and 2000 to 250 between 2000 and 2010.217 Obviously the 
number of credit card collection suits generally has increased over the past 
ten to twenty years, as has the reach of electronic databases. I performed 
similar searches for quantum meruit and breach of contract cases to 
determine the factors causing the increase in account stated cases. These 
cases increased from 41 to 174 and from 644 to 2,391 respectively. While 
breach of contract and quantum meruit cases multiplied by about four 
times, account stated cases multiplied nearly eighteen times.218 While this 
straw poll is no substitute for hard statistics, it does seem compelling 
evidence that account stated is back with a vengeance, at least in cases 
about credit cards. 
 Other evidence of the resurgent use of account stated in consumer 
collection can be found in the statements of consumer advocates. For 
example, some authors have noted “many [collection actions] allege that an 
account stated exists”;219 “[o]ften the complaint is pled as an account 
stated”;220 “[t]he second most common cause of action pleaded and by far 
the most dangerous for consumers, an account stated . . . .”221 “[Plaintiffs] 
often initiate collection cases against consumers without any 
documentation . . . [i]nstead, they simply offer up an affidavit from an 
employee . . . and/or sue on an account stated theory.”222  
 Both original creditors and debt buyers use implied account stated. 
When pled by debt buyers, it usually relies upon a rendition of account by 
the original creditor. Debt buyers attempting to rely upon their own 
renditions of account would face both the possible preemption of account 
stated by the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,223 and difficulty in 
establishing a prior relationship with the consumer. Reliance on a rendition 
by the original creditor means that the debt-buyer will need, at least, to 
produce a copy of a statement sent by the original creditor. Among large 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Searches performed 2/19/2013. The selection of available databases means that this is 
effectively a straw poll of appellate or otherwise reported cases, and may not measure the prevalence of 
trial court decisions based upon account stated. 
 218. Searches performed on 2/19/2013. The apparent increase in account stated cases reported 
may mirror a far greater increase in the number of trial-level debt-collection suits in which account 
stated is pleaded, however it would be difficult to obtain meaningful data to quantify these trial court 
increases. An additional variable is that the key phrases might appear in some cases which are not credit 
card collection actions using those particular causes of action, however, there is no reason to suppose 
that this weakness in the search significantly alters the conclusion; account stated has grown out of 
proportion with the other actions. 
 219. Glover, supra note 8, at 1122. 
 220. Holland, supra note 21. 
 221. Rooney, supra note 21. 
 222. Carolyn Carter, et. al., The Credit Card Market and Regulation: In Need of Repair, 10 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 23, 44–45 (2006). 
 223. See infra Part I.B.2(iii). 
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debt-buyers, only 6% of accounts sold included any account statements.224 
To sue on an account stated theory, as on a breach of contract theory, it is 
necessary to obtain evidence from the original creditor.  
 Some states have affirmed the resurrection. Texas,225 Connecticut,226 
Massachusetts,227 Iowa,228 Florida,229 and perhaps Ohio230 courts have 
accepted the use of account stated in consumer collection actions. However, 
as with the expansion of account stated in the nineteenth century, 
acceptance is not uniform. Some courts have expressed doubt about the use 
of account stated, most notably the courts of Pennsylvania.231 Further, 
particular cases have rejected account stated for policy reasons. For 
example, in New York, matrimonial fee arbitration rules have displaced 
account stated in that context.232 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 224. STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 35. 
 225. Dulong v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., 261 S.W.3d 890, 892 (Tex. App. 2008); followed by 
Jaramillo v. Portfolio Acquisitions, LLC., No. 14-08-00939-CV, 2010 WL 1197669, at *7 (Tex. App. 
Mar. 30, 2010) (“In contrast, a cause of action for an account stated is the proper tool for credit card 
collection.”).  
 226. Citi Bank (S.D.) N.A. v. Filip, No. CV-096-000823S, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1757, at 
*16 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 2010) (discussing the use of account stated in consumer collections in 
Connecticut). 
 227. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. DeCristoforo, No. 09-02536C, 2011 WL 1020497, at *6 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2011) (finding defendant “clearly liable” under account stated theory, but denying 
summary judgment due to disputed facts), vacated by Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. DeCristoforo, No. 12-P-
603, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 1131 (Table), at *3 (May 17, 2013). 
 228. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. Denboer, 791 N.W.2d 264, 273–75 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2010) (holding account stated appropriate for consumer collection actions). 
 229. Farley v. ChaseBank, U.S., N.A., 37 So.3d 936, 937–38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding 
that lower evidentiary requirements apply in account stated consumer collection action). 
 230. See Creditrust Corp. v. Richard, No. 99-CA-94, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3027, at *2 (Ct. 
App. July 7, 2000) (applying account stated doctrine in a consumer collection action), but see 
Worldwide Asset Purchasing L.L.C. v. Sandoval, No. 2007-CA-00159, 2008 WL 5104769, at *5 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 14, 2008) (holding that an account stated claim required a zero starting balance). 
 231. See Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. Clevenstine, 7 Pa. D. & C.5th 153, 157–58 (Ct. 
Com. Pl. 2009) (stating that an account stated theory may have been appropriate when credit card 
issuers gave cardholders fixed interest, but is less appropriate with the varied interest rates and fees of 
today); see generally Target Bank v. Samanez, 2007 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 433 (Ct. Com. Pl. 
2007), discussed infra. 
 232. Lewis & Merritt v. Smith, 650 N.Y.S.2d 921, 923 (Sup. Ct. 1996).  
 
[T]he rules have impacted upon the common law principle of an account stated 
where . . . that principle is utilized to imply agreement on billings in a 
matrimonial matter so as to defeat application of [the rules] . . . mere silence and 
failure to object to the billings cannot be construed as an implied assent when it 
equally suggests lack of assent. 
 
Id. (quoted in Lester Brickman, Mandatory Fee Arbitration Under New York’s Matrimonial Rules, 3 
CARDOZO J. CONFL. RESOL. 1 (2001), available at http://cardozojcr.com /issues/volume-3-1/article/). 
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B. Policy Problems of Account Stated 
 Courts across the country differ on the merits of using account stated in 
consumer collection actions. Some courts have been unequivocal in their 
rejection of account stated: “[a]n account stated is more appropriately pled 
in a situation in which two equal, sophisticated parties have an ongoing 
business relationship. An account stated theory is not appropriate in a credit 
card account case.”233 Others have taken a more nuanced approach, 
specifically rejecting the automatic implication of assent from silence.234 
Some state courts have excluded account stated from particular types of 
collection action in favor of other causes of action better suited to those 
cases.235 Other courts have defended the use of account stated236 against 
apparently conflicting state statutes237 and policy arguments.238 Still others, 
while supporting the principles of account stated, have imposed additional 
obstacles to successful pleas of account stated.239 On both sides, these 
decisions are generally those of trial courts or unpublished appellate 
opinions and thus, have a limited effect on the disposition of undefended 
collection actions. 
 To see the failings of the doctrine, we should look at it with fresh eyes. 
Forget, for a moment, that the doctrine has enjoyed three hundred years of 
approval in the courts and look at its effects. Forget, also, those rare cases 
in which the debtor explicitly assents and promises to pay the debt. Account 
                                                                                                                 
 233. Clevenstine, 7 Pa. D. & C. 5th at 157. 
 234. Samanez, 2007 Pa. Dist & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 433, at *23; see Nelson v. First National 
Bank Omaha, No. A04-579, 2004 WL 2711032, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (requiring more 
than the retention of billing statements “without objection”). 
 235. Jarmillio v. Portfolio Acquisitions, LCC, No. 14-08-00939-CV, 2010 WL 1197669, at *7 
(Tex. App. Mar. 30, 2010) (distinguishing actions on an account stated from actions on a sworn 
account). 
 236. Some of these cases arise from suits against debt collectors brought under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act. See Hadsell v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP, No. 12-cv-235-L, 2013 WL 
1386299, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2013) (dismissing Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim and holding that account 
stated is an accepted cause of action in credit card collection cases in California). 
 237. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. Denboer, 791 N.W.2d 264, 275–80 (Iowa App. 2010) 
(holding that section 537.5114 of the Iowa consumer credit code does not abolish account stated in 
consumer collection actions). 
 238. See Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. Spicer, No. 2009-774, 2009 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. 
LEXIS 244, at *9 (Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 6, 2009) (holding that policy arguments raised in Clevenstine 
regarding the complexity of credit card terms of agreement are essentially issues of fact and do not 
prevent a plea of account stated). 
 239. E.g., Citi Bank (S.D.) N.A. v. Filip, No. CV-09-6000823S, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1757, at *5, *7–8, *14–16 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 2010) (holding that account stated can be used in 
collection actions but to provide sufficient evidence plaintiff must produce copies of each statement of 
account rendered to defendant); Worldwide Asset Purchasing, L.L.C. v. Sandoval, No. 2007-CA-00159, 
2008 WL 5104769, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14, 2008) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); Creditrust Corp. v. 
Richard, No. 99-CA-94, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3027, at *7–8 (Ct. App. July 7, 2000) (accepting 
account stated but holding that it must be possible to trace the account back to a provable sum and 
preferably a zero balance). 
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stated assumes that, by failing to object to a bill, the consumer agrees the 
bill is correct and makes an enforceable promise to pay.240 In reality, 
however, consumers fail to dispute or reply to bills for many reasons: they 
may be unable to pay on time, but anticipate making payment at a later 
time; they may not receive the bill; they may not recognize the sender—
particularly if the bill is sent by a debt buyer, or sent after a substantial 
interval; they may simply mislay or forget the bill; or finally, they may 
receive but never read the bill. None of these would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that the consumer “assented” and “promised to pay” the 
bill. If account stated doctrine requires the courts to say that they have 
assented and promised to pay, then the assent and promise are legal fictions. 
Fictions are, as S.F.C. Milsom observed “a symptom of the deep conceptual 
artificiality into which logic has forced the common law.”241 In Part III 
below, this Article will examine the conceptual problem underlying the 
search for a principled justification of implied account stated.  
 The implication of assent is a fiction, but the law relies on many such 
fictions, so well-known and accepted that we hardly notice them at all.242 
However, the fictional circumstances implied by account stated do not 
match the expectations of consumers when they enter into contracts with 
businesses. Consumers are unaware of the doctrine and its effects. Even 
some information published as advice for consumers facing collection law 
suits does not mention account stated.243 Implied account stated is not in 
that category of fictions, which Lon Fuller described as “used with a 
complete consciousness of its falsity.”244 It is not like the untrue allegations 
of classical legal fictions, which were acknowledged to be false.245 The 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Capital One Bank v. Clevenstine, 7 Pa. D. & C. 5th 153, 157 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2009). 
 241. S.F.C. Milsom, Reason in the Development of the Common Law, 81 L. Q. REV. 496, 499 
(1965). 
 242. See generally LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967) (explaining the concept of a legal 
fiction); Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 873 (1986) (discussing legal 
fictions’ meaning, examples, and significance for law and letters); see Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions 
and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to conflate the moribund common law fictions 
that punctuate the first-year Property course with the broader category of legal 
fictions. Far from being a historical oddity, legal fictions are common features of 
not only our common law, but also our statutory and regulatory law. 
 
Id. 
 243. E.g., Richard Slottee, Debtors’ Rights, OR. STATE BAR (Jan. 2012) 
http://www.oregonstatebar.org/public/legalinfo/1021_DebtorsRights.htm. 
 244. FULLER, supra note 242, at 9–10 (“A fiction becomes wholly safe only when it is used with 
a complete consciousness of its falsity . . . it is precisely those false statement that are realized as being 
false that have utility.”). 
 245. For example, the allegation that the Island of Minorca was located in London. Mostyn v. 
Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1021 (K.B.). 
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fiction of implied account stated assumes that everyone—including the 
consumer—follows the same accounting practices as early modern 
merchants. For consumers, implied account stated is simply a harsh, archaic 
technicality. 
 The Common Pleas in Capital One v. Clevenstine makes the last 
general criticism of account stated: the doctrine places an unfair burden on 
consumers.246 Suppose that a consumer receives a bill. If she can pay the 
bill all is well. If she cannot pay the bill, the consumer must object within a 
reasonable time, otherwise an account stated will be implied, fixing the 
amount of the debt as the amount billed.247 That determination can be re-
opened only on very limited grounds, typically fraud and mistake.248 
Substantial resources are required to determine whether a modern consumer 
bill is error free.249 Many consumers lack the basic skills necessary to check 
a bill for non-obvious errors. For example, very few consumers are able to 
perform such basic financial operations as the comparison of the 
substantive terms of two credit card agreements or the calculation of 
interest on a mortgage.250 Further, if the consumer does detect an error in a 
bill, the burden is on her to articulate the problem to the business.251 These 
burdens are placed on consumers who are already in difficulty: they are 
unable to pay a bill they received. These are not burdens deliberately placed 
upon consumers by a legislature or through a widely known and long-
standing legal rule (such as the rule that one is bound by the terms of a 
contract, even if one has not read them). There is no reason why these 
consumers should be required to detect errors in the bill any sooner than 
statutory limitation periods require. Equally, businesses should not be 
partially relieved of their evidentiary burden simply by showing that they 
sent a bill to the consumer and received no reply. 
 A more disturbing use of account stated is found in Citibank v. 
Poynton, a New York case in which the debtor raised statutory defenses to a 
collection suit.252 While those defenses barred a suit for breach of the 
original credit card contract, the court held that they did not bar an account 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Captial One Bank v. Clevenstine, 7 Pa. D. & C.5th 153, 158 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2009). 
 247. Id. at 157 (“When a debtor has had an opportunity to scrutinize the account, his or her 
silence is prima facie evidence of acquiescence in an account stated.”). 
 248. Id. at 158. 
 249. Id. (finding that “[i]t is unreasonable to expect the average debtor to understand the 
changing terms of a customer agreement such that he or she can object to any invoice received in a 
timely manner”). 
 250. Alan M. White & Cathy L. Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 
233, 237 (2002). 
 251. Id. at 240. 
 252. See Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (App. Term 2000) (asserting 
that the use of a statutory defense is disturbing). 
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stated suit.253 By pleading account stated, the plaintiff was able to collect on 
a transaction for which collection was otherwise barred.254 
 There is no policy reason why account stated should not be subject to 
the same defenses as the original debt. Such a rule would seem to 
undermine the protections that legislatures intend to provide when they 
create similar defenses. Poynton should not be regarded simply as a single 
bad decision, but as an example of how account stated can trick courts into 
accepting bad arguments. Account stated seems, in its language, like 
novation: the parties agree to a renewal of contractual obligations. 
However, when assent is implied, the character of the transaction is 
different: it is nothing but an un-answered demand by a creditor to a debtor. 
The contractual associations of account stated and its “implication of 
assent” are, in these circumstances, merely a fiction. 
 The use of account stated to avoid statutory restriction is not new. 
Samuel Stoljar noted its use in nineteenth century cases,255 and concluded 
that its use most likely remained in the legitimation of semi-legal debts.256 
Whether this use is something we ought to approve of in the twenty-first 
century is doubtful. 
III. THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF ACCOUNT STATED 
 Until recently, the rarity of account stated cases has spared it much of 
the theoretical scrutiny applied to other causes of action.257 The central 
theoretical question is whether account stated is more like a contract or a 
quasi-contract. It is usually called “an agreement.” This statement, casting 
account stated as a variety of contract, is very often followed by the caveat 
that this “agreement” may be implied from retention without objection as 
described above.258 This section will argue that this “implication” is entirely 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 329. 
 255. Stoljar, supra note 51, at 378–81. 
 256. Id. at 382 (“In one area, however, account stated has continued to have a little more 
importance. This is the area of illegal or rather semi-illegal contracts.”) Stoljar goes on to note the mixed 
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Day v. William Hill, [1949] 1 All. E.R. 219 (U.K.)). 
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recent works often focus on the history of account stated. E.g., MILSOM, supra note, 46, at 376; Stoljar, 
supra note 51, at 376. 
 258. Haddock, supra note 59, at 78; see also, Belsheim, supra note 83, at 469–70 (providing an 
example and analysis of a relationship that could give rise to an action of account stated); Stoljar, supra 
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fictional, at least in the case of actions between businesses and consumers. 
The courts do not really mean to say that they believe the consumer has 
formed a voluntary agreement, in which she agreed with the creditor about 
the amount and validity of the debt, based on retention without objection. 
The law requires the courts to assume that the agreement exists. 
A. Account Stated as an Agreement 
 Traditionally, an account stated is an agreement, express or implied, to 
pay a pre-existing debt.259 The Restatement of Contracts adopts a slightly 
different formulation, but it still relies on assent.260 Most modern courts 
have used “agreement” language.261 Account stated is sometimes regarded 
as something more akin to an evidentiary presumption.262 In Illinois, 
account stated is described as an agreement but has the effects of an 
evidentiary presumption. The two explanations co-exist: the test for account 
stated described in agreement terms, but its effects limited to the 
determination of the amount of a debt.263 
                                                                                                                 
note 51, at 379 (explaining “settlement of accounts” in contractual terms, but later recognizing that some 
admissions of indebtedness are noncontractual). 
 259. For example, “[a]n ‘account stated’ is broadly defined as an agreement, based on the prior 
transactions between the parties to an open account.” 1 AM. JUR. 2D Accounts and Accounting § 26 
(2005); “An account stated is an agreement that the balance and all items of an account representing the 
previous monetary transactions of the parties are correct, together with a promise to pay that balance.” 
1A C.J.S. Account Stated § 1 (2005). 
 260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 282 (1979) (“An account stated is a 
manifestation of assent by debtor and creditor to a stated sum as an accurate computation of an amount 
due the creditor.”). 
 261. E.g., U.S. Neurosurgical v. City of Chi., 572 F.3d 325, 333 (7th Cir. 2009) (“An account 
stated is an agreement between the parties . . . .” (quoting Dreyer Medical Clinic, S.C. v. Corral, 591 
N.E.2d 111, 114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992))); Heidtman Steel Prods. v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc., 919 
F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (D. Ohio 2013) (“[A]n account stated is based on a separate agreement between 
the parties . . . .” (quoting Fisher Sand & Gravel v. Neal A. Sweebe, Inc., 810 N.W.2d 277, 281–82 
(Mich. 2011))); Petersen Bros., Inc. v. Phoenix Underground Constr., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-0936AWIDLB, 
2012 WL 6020112, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 262. See, e.g., Freeland v. Heron, Lenox & Co., 11 U.S. (Cranch) 147, 151 (1812) (“[H]is 
silence and acquiescence shall bind him. [A]t least so far as to cast the onus probandi on him.” 
(emphasis added)); Nw. Motors v. James, 788 P.2d 584, 587 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (“Comment c to § 
282 [of the 2d Restatement of Contracts] suggests that an account stated does not itself result in 
discharge, but is used as an admission of the contents of the account for evidentiary purposes . . . .”); 
Citibank N.A. v. Hull, 26 Pa. D. & C.5th 188, 199 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2012) (to similar effect); also, less 
clearly Bowman v. Tooker, 105 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (App. Div. 1951) (“[R]eference therein to an account 
stated for the year 1949 is merely an evidentiary allegation, not the statement of another cause of 
action.” (emphasis added)). 
 263. Patrick Eng’g Inc. v. City of Naperville, 976 N.E.2d 318, 336 (Ill. 2012) (“[A]n account 
stated is ‘merely a final determination of the amount of an existing debt.’” (quoting Motive Parts Co. of 
Am., Inc. v. Robinson, 369 N.E.2d 119, 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977))); D.S.A. Fin. Corp. v. Cnty. of Cook, 
801 N.E.2d 1075, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); see Dreyer Medical Clinic, S.C. v. Corral, 591 N.E.2d 111, 
114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[A]n account stated is an agreement between parties who previously engaged 
in transactions,” but “it merely determines the amount of the debt where liability previously existed.”). 
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 The evidentiary view is understandable given the dependence of 
account stated on a pre-existing debt and the possibility of re-opening an 
account on grounds of mistake or fraud. However, even courts that adopt 
this view rely on the same underlying elements for the existence of an 
account stated, and those elements still involve at least the allegation of an 
agreement about the amount owed.264 
 The “agreement” explanation therefore is the favored rationale for 
account stated. However, at least one author found the account stated 
“agreements” theory problematic because it violates the silent acceptance 
rule discussed below.265 Because the rule against silent acceptance is a 
contractual rule,266 it is necessary to consider the relationship between 
account stated and contracts before pressing the silent acceptance argument. 
 Describing account stated as an agreement presents some doctrinal 
confusion. Even express account stated, which depends on an agreement, is 
not quite the same as a contract because express account stated is more 
limited in scope. Account stated requires some prior debt.267 Its subject 
matter is limited and inflexible: account stated can only relate to the 
payment of a specified sum of money.268 There is even some difficulty in 
determining the consideration involved in account stated: it is usually said 
that the stating of the account is the consideration.269 These limitations 
should not immunize account stated from the ordinary principles of contract 
law. If account stated is to be discussed and justified as an agreement, then 
it should conform to basic principles about the meaning of “agreement.” In 
the next Part, I will focus on the most problematic inconsistency between 
implied account stated doctrine as it has been recently applied, and the 






                                                                                                                 
 264. Brobst v. Johnson Realty Group, Ltd., No. 1-11-0991, 2012 IL App. (1st) 110991-U, at *4 
(Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 28, 2012); Dreyer Medical Clinic, S.C, 591 N.E.2d at 114; See also Motive Parts Co. 
of Am., Inc., 369 N.E.2d at 122 (“The agreement mentioned in these definitions must, of course, 
manifest the mutual assent of the debtor and creditor.” (citing Canadian Ace Brewing Co. v. Swiftsure 
Beer Co., 149 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958))); Patrick Eng’g Inc., 976 N.E.2d at 336–37 
(requiring uniformity in the “amounts actually billed” and the “amounts allegedly billed” to establish a 
correct statement of account).  
 265. A.L.C., When Silence Gives Consent, 29 YALE L.J. 441, 444 (1920). 
 266. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1979) (stating that silence in response 
to an offer is generally not acceptance). 
 267. 1A C.J.S. Account Stated § 5 at 65 (2005). 
 268. Id., at 62. 
 269. See BAKER, supra note 52. 
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B. Account Stated as a Violation of the Silent Acceptance Rule 
 A well-known rule of contract law is that a contract cannot be accepted 
by silence.270 This rule is embodied in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts section 69, which provides three exceptions to the rule that 
silence cannot generally constitute a contractual acceptance. The exceptions 
are: (1) where the offeree both takes offered services and has reason to 
know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation; (2) 
where the offeror tells the offeree that assent can be given by silence, and 
the offeree is silent with the intention to accept the offer; and (3) where it is 
reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to 
accept, particularly in the case where a trade usage or course of dealing 
gives the offeror the understanding that silence will constitute 
acceptance.271 The rule against silent acceptance is also found in 
internationally accepted statements of contract law.272 The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts does not reconcile the silent acceptance rule with 
account stated.273 
 When it comes to account stated, silent acceptance is permitted. 
Looking back to its origins, we can see that the rule once filled a space 
within one of our modern exceptions: account stated arose from trade 
practices of international merchants.274 International merchants accepted 
that receiving an account by post created a duty either to object or assent to 
the account received.275 For merchants, silence inferred an assent because it 
was understood in their community that it was assent.276 
                                                                                                                 
 270. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1979) (stating the exceptions to the 
rule). 
 271. Id., at cmt. (d). 
 272. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, at 6, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.14 (2010) art. 18(1) (“Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount 
to acceptance.”). See also INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 43–45 (3d ed. 2010) (“[A]s a rule mere silence or 
inactivity on the part of the offeree does not allow the inference that the offeree assents to the offer.”). 
 273. Implied account stated is described by the Restatement as a “manifestation of assent.” See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 282 (1979) (neglecting to discuss the potential conflict with 
the silent acceptance rule in any comment).  
 274. A.L.C., supra note 265; see also MILSOM, supra note 46, at 136 (explaining the London 
custom of concessit solvere, which was used with foreign traders). 
 275. Glover, supra note 8, at 1122; Lockwood v. Thorne, 11 N.Y. 170, 173–74 (1854). 
 
Between merchants at home, an account which as been presented and no 
objection made thereto after the lapse of several posts, is treated, under ordinary 
circumstances, as being by acquiescence a stated account. Between merchants in 
different countries a longer time is given, but if no objection be made, after 
several opportunities of writing have occurred, it is considered acquiescence. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 276. A.L.C., supra note 265. 
2013] The Fiction of Implied Assent in Consumer Debt Collection 379 
 
 Attempts to make account stated conform to modern ideas of 
agreement are inadequate. They rely upon a legal fiction, in which modern 
consumers and banks follow the same custom as early-modern international 
merchants in London. 
 The absurdity of this position becomes most apparent if one reverses 
the positions of the consumer and the bank. If a consumer sends a statement 
of how much the consumer thinks the bank owes him, do both consumer 
and bank (1) expect the bank to review the statement in a timely manner, 
(2) expect the bank to notify the consumer in a timely manner if it disagrees 
with the statement, and (3) believe that silence by the bank means that the 
bank agrees with the statement and promises to pay the amount owing to 
the consumer? Clearly not. The wisdom of a rule that encourages anyone, 
consumer or bank, to send out statements in the hope of being ignored is 
questionable. 
 Having established that implied account stated violates the silent 
acceptance rule, how can this violation be explained? Historically, the 
explanation is simple enough: when implied account stated first became 
law, it simply enforced merchant customs.277 Today, that type of case 
would not offend the silent acceptance rule.  
 However, violations of the silent acceptance rule are harder to explain 
if account stated applies between non-merchants. One writer considered the 
problem in 1920, noting the existence of account stated: “[w]here an 
unsettled running account exists between two persons, if one sends to the 
other a statement of the account it is generally held that retention of this by 
the other party without any expressed objection will render the amount an 
account stated.”278 His solution was to conceptualize account stated as 
something closer to an evidentiary rule than a cause of action: “[i]t seems, 
however, that silence here operates rather as an evidential than an operative 
fact. It is a rebuttable admission against interest, not the conclusive 
acceptance . . . .”279 This approach is in accordance with a few cases and the 
practices of a few states, as noted above,280 but it is not reflected in the way 
courts generally imply account stated from rendition and retention without 
objection of a statement of account. 
 The conflict therefore remains between the rule against silent 
acceptance and implied account stated. This conflict cannot be resolved 
purely by discarding the “agreement” conceptualization of account stated. 
This Article proposes that the conflict can be resolved only by reform. The 
                                                                                                                 
 277. Id.; see also ANSON, supra note 45, at 35 (explaining that merchant custom would support 
written agreements when traditional consideration was present); MILSOM, supra note 46, at 136 
(explaining the London custom of concessit solvere, which was used with foreign traders). 
 278. A.L.C., supra note 265, at 444. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text. 
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concept of account stated must be confined so that it does not imply assent 
from silence beyond the boundaries generally set by contract law. 
C. Nature of “Implication” in Account Stated 
 If the agreement explanation of account stated is problematic, what is 
the alternative? I argue that the answer lies in the nature of the implication 
in account stated: account stated began as an agreement, either express or 
implied in fact, but it is often treated by the courts as a quasi-contract. 
Today, account stated is usually treated like a quasi-contract when the 
debtor is silent, like an express contract when the debtor expressly assents, 
and like a contract implied in fact when the debtor makes part payment. The 
tension between these positions is most apparent in the New York case of 
Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Brown-Serulovic in which the court 
doubted whether a small part payment is sufficient to imply assent from the 
part payment.281 The court in Brown-Serulovic concluded that a small part 
payment was insufficient.282 Yet, the plaintiff would have succeeded if it 
had been able to show the necessary facts in an account stated claim: a 
statement rendered and retained without objection.283 Part payment is 
somehow less a sign of agreement than total silence and inaction. 
 This confusion between contracts implied in fact and contracts implied 
in law is not unique to account stated. The same confusion also arises in 
quantum meruit cases.284 Even the phrase “contracts implied in law” is 
misleading because such “contracts” are really about restitution, not 
contract.285 
 As in other areas, courts dealing with account stated use “implied” 
ambiguously. For example, a New York court held in one case: “defendant 
impliedly agreed to pay the amount indicated when she received and 
retained the monthly statements without objection within a reasonable 
period.”286 While another New York court held: 
 
                                                                                                                 
 281. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Brown-Serulovic, 948 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (App. Div. 2012). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Candace S. Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum Meruit Litigation, 35 AM. U. L. 
REV. 547, 553–56 (1986). 
 285. Juli Loden, The Earth is Not Flat and “A Quasi Contract Is Not A Contract At All”, 11 
TRANSACTIONS: THE TENN. J. OF BUS. LAW 167, 187 (2010) (observing that in the absence of a writ-
system, there is no need to maintain the fiction that quasi-contracts are contracts). Cf., Clare Dalton, An 
Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1011 (1985) (concluding that the 
position that quasi-contracts are not contracts “obscures the fact that the finding of contractual 
implication is guided in the so-called ‘private’ sphere by the same considerations that dictate the 
imposition of quasi-contract”). 
 286. Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Jones, 708 N.Y.S.2d 517, 519 (App. Div. 2000). 
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[W]hile the mere silence and failure to object to an account stated 
cannot be construed as an agreement to the correctness of the 
account, the factual situation attending the particular transactions 
may be such that, in the absence of an objection made within a 
reasonable time, an implied account stated may be found.287 
 
The first statement means that assent is implied in law: the court inferred 
that the Defendant agreed to pay the debt merely by receiving the monthly 
statements and not objecting to them. The court made this inference not 
because the facts indicate actual assent, but because the law deems them to 
be assent. The second statement indicates an implied in fact approach: the 
implication is not drawn automatically, but it depends on the circumstances. 
In the right circumstances an implication is drawn from silence. The second 
statement unfortunately fails to further describe the circumstances in which 
an implication-in-fact should be made. 
 Is implied account stated “implied in fact” or “implied in law”? The 
current answer is that it is implied in law. Rendition of the account followed 
by retention without objection is all that is required for account stated to be 
implied in law. 
 The arguments against the expansion of account stated beyond the 
mercantile class and the modern policy arguments are united by their focus 
on the fictional nature of the implied account stated. The West Virginia 
Supreme Court in McGraw thought that to imply an account stated would 
be to “pretend.”288 The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in 
Clevenstine listed the reasons why it is fictional to imply assent from 
rendition and silence in the circumstances of a modern consumer-bank 
relationship.289 
 Therefore, this Article’s argument is not against any implied account 
stated, but only against implication by law regardless of circumstances. 
Having shown the existence of the fiction, its origins, present use, and 
policy criticisms, the question remains—what can be done about it? 
D. The Merchant Rule Must Return 
 The solution to both the policy and the theoretical problems of implied 
account stated is simple: make implied account stated implied in fact by 
abolishing the implication of assent from silence. Instead, the implication of 
assent from silence should be a rule solely between businessmen for whom 
                                                                                                                 
 287. Bank of Am., N.A. USA v. Hyatt, No. 2008-1655, 2011 WL 3689374, at *1–2 (N.Y. App. 
Term Aug. 16, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Yannelli, Zevin & Civardi v. Sakol, 
749 N.Y.S.2d 270, 270 (App. Div. 2002). 
 288. McGraw v Traders Nat’l Bank, 63 S.E. 398, 400 (W. Va. 1908). 
 289. Capital One v. Clevenstine, 7 Pa. D. & C.5th 153, 157–58 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2009). 
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silence is generally considered acceptance.290 This change would remove 
the automatic assumption of assent from set facts which makes implied 
account stated a legal fiction in consumer collection cases. This change 
would also bring account stated back into the theoretical fold of true 
contracts. This change would not even prevent the implication of account 
stated in deserving circumstances that actually imply assent;291 it would 
simply make that implication akin to the more familiar implication of a 
contract in fact. The idea that acceptance by silence in the face of an 
invoice is an accepted mercantile custom still has some currency292 
particularly in international trade.293 The Uniform Commercial Code 
includes a similar rule in section 2-207(2): the assent of an offeror to 
additional terms proposed by the offeree is presumed where the offeror fails 
to object within a reasonable time.294 The rule is explicitly limited to 
merchants.295 Both parties would reasonably expect the implication of 
assent in business relationships where the custom exists.  
 This change could be achieved in one of three ways. First, state courts 
in states like Maryland or West Virginia, could enforce the merchant 
requirement since the requirement was either never considered or was 
explicitly preserved. The courts could refuse any case except between 
merchants or their modern analogues. The meaning of “merchant and 
merchant” could reasonably be stretched to include other businesses or 
persons acting in a business capacity, but not consumers. This approach 
would effectively prevent the automatic implication of account stated in 
consumer collection actions. While this solution has the advantage of 
following prior decisions, it lacks a sound theoretical basis: the merchant 
rule itself does not resolve whether account stated must adhere to contract 
                                                                                                                 
 290. Assuming, arguendo, that such a class of businessmen and such a practice still exists. 
 291. E.g., Nw. Motors, Ltd. v. James, 788 P.2d 584, 588 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
manifesting acceptance of an amount due is an account stated, although it is not entirely clear if this is 
really a case of implied in fact or express assent). 
 292. Almost exactly the words of account stated are found in a modern description of the 
“commercial fact that acceptance plus silence for an unreasonable time most likely spell acceptance not 
only in legal satisfaction but in actual satisfaction of the contract as understood by the parties.” Am. Bar 
Ass’n, An Apraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 
2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 1268 (1991) (emphasis in original) (referring to failure to 
object to delivery of defective bulk transfers). 
 293. For example, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal use implied account stated in determining 
claims, characterizing it as “a well-established general principle in various legal systems that in 
commercial relationships one party may be obligated to pay another party . . . a sum specified in an 
invoice if it receives the invoice but does not object to it within a certain period of time.” John R. Crook, 
Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 278, 296 (1983) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dames & 
Moore v. Iran, Award No. 97-54-3, 1983 WL 233294, at *8 (Iran U.S. Cl. Trib. 1983)). 
 294. LARRY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-
207:119 (3rd ed. 2012). 
 295. Id. 
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principles. Questions would still remain about the breadth of the class 
between whom account stated would apply without a principle for 
identifying class members.  
 Second, state courts that have not endorsed the use of account stated in 
consumer collection actions could continue to do so based on its 
inconsistency with modern contract principles. This would require a 
holding that an account stated can be implied from retention without 
objection only where an exception to the rule against silent acceptance 
already exists. In effect, such a decision would allow only an implied-in-
fact account stated. This approach would have the same effect as the first 
approach, and would result in a more theoretically consistent contract law, 
which might more accurately identify the situations where implication of 
assent from silence is appropriate. Account stated could be implied in 
accordance with a wider, more modern merchant requirement, which 
conforms to the silent assent exceptions in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. 
 Third, state legislatures could reform the substantive law of account 
stated in either of the above ways. Legislative intervention has the 
advantage of being clear, public, and conclusive. However, this issue seems 
unlikely to gain legislative attention. 
CONCLUSION 
 Account stated threatens the welfare of consumers in two ways: it 
reduces the evidence required to obtain a judgment against a consumer in a 
collection action and, in certain cases, it allows collectors to evade statutory 
controls on debt collection and contracting. The solution to the second 
problem is simple: judges must not allow themselves to be carried away by 
the idea that account stated creates fresh liability. Account stated has 
always required some genuine underlying transaction. When statutes seek 
to regulate consumer transactions, those statutes must preempt actions 
relying on an account stated theory. Otherwise, account stated will be a tool 
for the evasion of consumer protection statutes. 
 The first problem is a much more substantial one, but its solution is as 
simple: implied account stated must not be permitted in consumer 
collection actions. This Article has presented three arguments against the 
use of account stated in consumer collection actions: (1) the historical 
argument, that account stated was limited to disputes between merchants 
and in some states this limitation remains good law; (2) the policy 
argument, that account stated is bad for consumer protection and its 
assumptions about consumer behavior are wrong; and (3) the theoretical 
argument, that implied account stated is inconsistent with the fundamental 
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principles of modern contract law. Each argument supports the others. The 
historical origin of implied account stated is consistent with modern 
principles about silent acceptance, and it demonstrates that the basic 
assumptions underlying implied account stated are those of commercial—
not consumer—dealings. The modern principles of contract law show that 
the use of account stated in consumer actions is exceptional, while its 
historical uses were not. Finally, the policy argument demonstrates the need 
for the judiciary and legislature to act to prevent the misuse of account 
stated. 
 The overwhelming advantage of a simple prohibition of implied 
account stated in consumer collection actions lies in a fact of modern 
collection suits: consumers rarely defend them. In the vast majority of the 
cases, courts are left to decide whether the plaintiff’s case is sufficient to 
obtain judgment without argument from the defendant. Therefore, implied 
account stated allows plaintiffs to produce less evidence in a venue where 
they are unlikely to be challenged and still obtain judgment. Removing 
implied account stated entirely from the plaintiffs’ pleading menu would 
affect the court’s decision-making process, and plaintiffs would be left to 
plead breach of contract and provide the requisite evidence.  
 The resurrection of account stated has been a success, at least for 
plaintiffs in collection actions. However, its evidence-reducing qualities 
make it part of the broken system of debt collection, which fails to 
sufficiently protect consumers. It is not, as Bucci claimed, a clear and 
equitable rule,296 but a harsh and archaic one, with significant variations 
between states. Implied account stated favors seventeenth century trade 
practice over contemporary principles. Its application to consumers is unfair 
and, to the consumers at least, unexpected. It is time to amend this part of 
the broken debt collection system and put account stated in its place as part 
of modern contract law. 
                                                                                                                 
 296. Bucci, supra note 88, at 659. 
